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Abstract
Free and Open Source Software (FOSS) components are ubiquitous in both proprietary
and open source applications. In this dissertation we discuss challenges that large software
vendors face when they must integrate and maintain FOSS components into their software
supply chain. Each time a vulnerability is disclosed in a FOSS component, a software
vendor must decide whether to update the component, patch the application itself, or just do
nothing as the vulnerability is not applicable to the deployed version that may be old enough
to be not vulnerable. This is particularly challenging for enterprise software vendors that
consume thousands of FOSS components, and offer more than a decade of support and
security fixes for applications that include these components.
First, we design a framework for performing security vulnerability experimentations. In
particular, for testing known exploits for publicly disclosed vulnerabilities against different
versions and software configurations.
Second, we provide an automatic screening test for quickly identifying the versions of
FOSS components likely affected by newly disclosed vulnerabilities: a novel method that
scans across the entire repository of a FOSS component in a matter of minutes. We show
that our screening test scales to large open source projects.
Finally, for facilitating the global security maintenance of a large portfolio of FOSS
components, we discuss various characteristics of FOSS components and their potential
impact on the security maintenance effort, and empirically identify the key drivers.
Keywords Security Vulnerabilities; Security Maintenance; Third-party Components;
Free and Open Source Software; Vulnerability Screening Test
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Chapter 1
Introduction
According to a recent Black Duck study [149], more than 65% proprietary applications
leverage Free and Open Source Software (FOSS) components: this choice speeds up ap-
plication development and flexibility [77], because FOSS components can be (and often
are) used “as-is” without any modifications [90, 137]. The price to pay are security flaws
being found in these components, in particular, for web applications which are the tar-
get of many well known exploits and a fertile ground for the discovery of new security
vulnerabilities [142], especially when the source code is publicly available.
Since the security of a software product depends on the security of all its components,
securing the whole software supply chain is of utmost importance for software vendors.
Thus, FOSS components should be subject to the same security scrutiny as one’s own
code1 [103].
FOSS components impose particular challenges as well as provide unique opportunities.
For example, FOSS licenses contain usually a very strong “no warranty” clause and no
service-level agreement. On the other hand, FOSS licenses allow to modify the source
code and, thus, to fix issues without depending on (external) software vendors.
When addressing FOSS security in an academic setting, the most debated question is
whether FOSS is more or less secure than proprietary software [72,75,143]. This discussion
received a new impetus since Heartbleed (CVE-2014-0160), Shellshock (CVE-2014-6271),
Apple’s GoToFail bug (CVE-2014-1266), or Microsoft’s sChannel flaw (CVE-2014-6321).
Yet, we would like to argue that the ultimate answer for this question may not be that
important from the point of view of the software industry: certain FOSS components
may be the de-facto standard for some applications, and certain FOSS components may
offer functionalities that are very expensive to re-implement. Indeed, this debate distracts
from more pressing issues that we describe below.
Consider the following (daily) scenario in the activities of software vendors: when a new
1For example, SAP, a large European software vendor, runs static code analysis tools to verify the combined code bases
of its applications and FOSS components [29].
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vulnerability in a FOSS component is discovered, the vendor has to verify whether it affects
customers who consume software solutions into which that particular FOSS component
was bundled. If the answer is positive, the vendor has to provide support (issue updates,
or provide custom security fixes) to all customers that are (or may be) affected by the
vulnerability.
For instance, in Enterprise resource planning (ERP) systems and industrial control
systems the need for such an activity may occur years after deployment of the selected
FOSS component. The more pressing issues in which the software vendors are interested
in comprise of assessing not only the direct impact of vulnerabilities in third-party com-
ponents on their products, but also in assessing the impact on the effort associated with
the security maintenance of such components.
1.1 Problems of Secure FOSS Integration and Consumption
The above scenario includes many important aspects, which we break down into several
sub-problems below:
Problem 1 : Besides the vulnerabilities discovered in a FOSS component that may affect
the application that consumes it, the security of a software offering depends on the rest of
its constituents as well. A successful exploitation may be possible not only because of the
vulnerabilities in the source code, but also because of the environments on which appli-
cations are deployed and run: such execution environments usually consist of application
servers, databases and other supporting applications (including the aforementioned FOSS
components). As a part of necessary activities for securing the software supply chain, it
is important to test whether known exploits for software components can be reproduced in
different settings, and understand their potential effects.
Problem 2 : Indeed, to obtain a vulnerability proof-of-concept, a vendor may test a
product that contains a potentially vulnerable FOSS component against a working exploit,
but for many vulnerabilities there are no public exploits immediately available [8]. Even if
such exploits exist, they must be adapted to trigger the FOSS vulnerability in the context
of the consuming application, which requires significant effort. An alternative is to apply
static analysis security testing tools (SAST) against the FOSS component. Unfortunately,
it is difficult for vendors to locate sources of security vulnerabilities within the sheer
number of FOSS components, especially when they are used as “black boxes” [90, 137].
Such an analysis requires a solid understanding of the source code of a component in
question and its usage context [90]. It also requires a significant expertise in chosen
SAST tools [18], as these tools can generate thousands of potentially false warnings for
large projects. Further, the analysis may require days for processing even a single ‘FOSS-
release’ ‘main-application’ pair [2]. All this significantly complicates the task of security
2
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analysis of third-party FOSS components and increases the chances that vulnerabilities in
these components will be left unresolved by vendors [62]. Moreover, when several FOSS
releases are used in many different products, the above solutions do not scale: thus, we
need to understand what could be an accurate and efficient screening test for the presence
of a vulnerability within many (older) versions of a FOSS component?
Problem 3 : When such a screening test is available, it can be used for company-wide
estimates to empirically assess the likelihood that an older version of a FOSS component
may be affected by a newly disclosed vulnerability, as well as the potential maintenance
effort required for upgrading or fixing that version. For this task, it is important to un-
derstand which characteristics of a FOSS component (number of contributors, popularity,
lines of code or choice of programming language, etc.) are likely to be sources of “trou-
bles” for security maintenance (the number of vulnerabilities of a FOSS product is only a
facet of a trouble, as a component may be used by hundreds of products). Can different
models for maintenance of FOSS components, as well as different factors that characterize
these components, have significantly different impact on the global security maintenance
effort of large software vendors?
1.2 Contributions
The aim of this dissertation is to assist software vendors in identifying relevant properties
of FOSS components that would facilitate their security maintenance, as well as finding
evidence that can be used for identifying which versions of FOSS components across the
third-party component portfolio of vendors may be affected by known or newly disclosed
security vulnerabilities. This would allow vendors to quickly identify which customers may
be affected and plan their security maintenance activities accordingly. We also propose
models that focus on the actual effort of security maintenance required for resolving these
security issues. The main contributions of this dissertation are as follows:
A case study at a large software vendor, aimed at identifying the factors to consider
when evaluating the impact of FOSS selection choices on the security maintenance
effort.
An open source framework for performing security vulnerability experimentations and
testing, in particular, obtaining evidence that would show whether existing exploits
for known vulnerabilities can be reproduced in different settings and environments,
for better understanding of their technical impact, and facilitating discovery of new
vulnerabilities.
An automatic scalable vulnerability screening test for estimating the likelihood of
an older version of a FOSS component to be affected by a newly disclosed vulnerabil-
3
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ity, using the vulnerability fix. We also provide an insight on the empirical probability
that a version of a potential vulnerable component might not actually be vulnerable
if it is too old (or that its update might be likely costly). We provide a manual vali-
dation of the method, as well as an empirical analysis of the trade-offs between the
likelihood that an older version is affected by a newly disclosed vulnerability and the
potential maintenance effort required for upgrading to a fixed version (using popular
FOSS projects), showing that the approach scales to thousands of revisions of large
code bases.
A model for assessing the impact of various characteristics of FOSS components on the
security maintenance effort of a large portfolio of FOSS components. We empirically
test these factors, impacting the global vulnerability resolution process of third-party
components of a large software vendor, on three different maintenance models:
1. The centralized model, where vulnerabilities of a FOSS component are fixed
centrally and then pushed to all consuming products (and therefore costs scale
sub-linearly in the number of products);
2. The distributed model, where each development team fixes its own component
and effort scales linearly with usage;
3. The hybrid model, where only the least used FOSS components are selected and
maintained by individual development teams.
The work on this dissertation was performed in the context of the European Project
no. 317387 SECENTIS in collaboration with an industrial partner – SAP. This work
represents the research carried out by the author, and its outcome may not necessarily
represent the official position of SAP.
1.3 Dissertation Structure
This dissertation is structured as follows:
Chapter 2 provides some background on FOSS software and the broad issues of secu-
rity certification of third-party components, as well as the identification of vulnerabilities.
This chapter was partially published in:
[48] S. Dashevskyi, A. D. Brucker, and F. Massacci. “On the Security Cost of Using
a Free and Open Source Component in a Proprietary Product”. In Proceedings of
the 2016 Engineering Secure Software and Systems Conference, 2016.
Chapter 3 describes a case study at a large European software vendor which integrates
a large number of FOSS components into its products, and for which the present research
is relevant: (1) we describe the challenges that the vendor faces when consuming third-
party FOSS components; (2) discuss the process of building a theory on various FOSS
4
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maintenance aspects based on internal discussions with vendor’s software developers and
researchers; and (3) provide our understanding of various processes of FOSS maintenance
and consumption adopted by the vendor. A part of the content of this chapter was
submitted to:
[46] S. Dashevskyi, A. D. Brucker, and F. Massacci. “On the Security Maintenance
Cost of Open Source Components”. Submitted to ACM Transactions on Internet
Technology (Special Issue on the Economics of Security and Privacy).
Chapter 4 describes TestREx – a framework for repeatable exploits that allows
performing penetration and security testing, in particular running and adapting exploits
against potentially vulnerable web applications to identify whether they are affected by
the vulnerability. This chapter is the result of a joint work with Daniel Ricardo Dos
Santos, a fellow PhD student. This chapter was partially published in:
[49] S. Dashevskyi, D. R. Dos Santos, F. Massacci, and A. Sabetta. “TestREx: a
testbed for repeatable exploits”. In Proceedings of the 7th USENIX Workshop on
Cyber Security Experimentation and Test, 2014.
[136] A. Sabetta, L. Compagna, S. Ponta, S. Dashevskyi, D.R. Dos Santos, and F.
Massacci. “Multi-Context Exploit Test Management”. US Patent App. 14/692,203,
2015.
Chapter 5 describes the screening test for estimating whether a given vulnerability
is present in a version of a FOSS component. Our analysis supports software vendors in
prioritizing their FOSS related maintenance and development efforts. We showed that it
can scale to large open source projects. This chapter will be submitted to:
[47] S. Dashevskyi, A. D. Brucker, and F. Massacci. “A Screening Test for Disclosed
Vulnerabilities in FOSS Components”. To be submitted to ACM Transactions on
Software Engineering.
Chapter 6 illustrates our models for assessing the impact of various characteristics of
FOSS components on the effort required for their security maintenance, and provides an
empirical analysis of these factors. This chapter was partially published in:
[48] S. Dashevskyi, A. D. Brucker, and F. Massacci. “On the Security Cost of Using
a Free and Open Source Component in a Proprietary Product”. In Proceedings of
the 2016 Engineering Secure Software and Systems Conference, 2016.
[46] S. Dashevskyi, A. D. Brucker, and F. Massacci. “On the Security Maintenance
Cost of Open Source Components”. Submitted to ACM Transactions on Internet
Technology (Special Issue on the Economics of Security and Privacy).
Finally, Chapter 7 reflects on the main contributions of this work, and provides
discussion on the future work.
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Chapter 2
Background
This chapter aims to provide the background on the consumption of third-party FOSS
components, as well as to discuss the broad issues of security certification of third-party
components.
2.1 Overview of Third-party Components
Proprietary software development usually consumes several types of third-party compo-
nents. The most important components (either whole sub-systems, or libraries) are:
• Outsourced development and sub-contracting: components are developed by a differ-
ent legal entity based on a custom contract. As the software is implemented based
on a customer-specific contract and is uniquely tailored to its business needs [159],
the consuming party can specify the required compliance and security guidelines.
Depending on the contract, such components can be either shipped in the binary or
in the source form.
• Proprietary (standard) software components: components are licensed from a third-
party. For this third-party, this is a standard offering, i.e., the same component is
offered to multiple customers. Thus, there is only a very limited room for, e.g., influ-
encing the security development processes at the supplier. Usually, such components
are shipped as binaries.
• FOSS components: grant free access to the source code, as well as the freedom
to distribute modified versions, provided that certain licensing restrictions are re-
spected [134]. There are many open source licenses that describe different legal
aspects in different ways, including the detailed conditions under which FOSS can
be distributed (see [33] and [133] for a comprehensive discussion on FOSS licenses).
7
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2.2 What Makes FOSS Special?
FOSS components share aspects with both outsourced development and subcontracting,
as well as with standard proprietary software components. For example, FOSS compo-
nents can be modified, adapted, and maintained by the customer (this is what they have
in common with outsourcing and subcontracting).
Similarly to standard proprietary software components, FOSS components usually pro-
vide a fixed set of interfaces and functionalities that consuming products need to be
adapted to (instead of having a custom made component that “just fits”). Technically,
FOSS licenses are particular legal contracts that determine the rules under which a soft-
ware component can be used [33, 57]. Thus, one could expect that there is no need to
handle them differently from non-FOSS third-party components, but this is not the case.
In practice, there are at least five aspects that are often considered to be special:
1. As FOSS components are easily available without initial costs, this might misguide
developers to use them without properly assessing their licenses in detail [134]. For
large software vendors, the legal check of the software license and the warranty is a
part of the purchasing process: the derivative work that may be created by making
custom fixes of FOSS components and re-distributing them is an important aspect.
For instance, licenses such as GNU GPL1, require any derivate work to be distributed
under the same license, which may not be acceptable for proprietary software vendors.
It may be also difficult to identify what is exactly the derivative work in some cases
– this may create additional problems for proprietary vendors (see Carver [33] for a
more comprehensive discussion on open source software licenses and potential legal
issues). As FOSS components are often simply downloaded from the Internet, it may
be more difficult for vendors to enforce legal checks.
2. When FOSS components are being integrated into the target application, it increases
the overall costs of the resulting software product due to additional development and
maintenance activities [3]. Indeed, as pointed by Ven and Mannaert [162], the most
preferred way to cut these costs is contributing fixes back to the FOSS community.
Unfortunately, on practice this strategy is applicable for small generic fixes, that are
also useful for the community. There may be specific and more extensive modifica-
tions (including fixing newly disclosed vulnerabilities for older versions of a FOSS
component) that are important for specific business users, but not for the FOSS
community. The authors [162] argue that these more extensive fixes may require
different strategies such as updating only over specific periods of time (for backward
compatibility), or forking a component (for custom modifications). Regardless of
which of the latter strategies is chosen, this often results into significant additional
work due to maintenance.
1 https://www.gnu.org/licenses/gpl-3.0.en.html
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3. Most FOSS licenses contain rather strong “no warranty” clauses. For instance,
the GNU GPL license contains the following disclaimer: “THERE IS NO WAR-
RANTY FOR THE PROGRAM, TO THE EXTENT PERMITTED BY APPLICA-
BLE LAW. EXCEPT WHEN OTHERWISE STATED IN WRITING THE COPY-
RIGHT HOLDERS AND/OR OTHER PARTIES PROVIDE THE PROGRAM AS
IS WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EITHER EXPRESSED OR IM-
PLIED, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.
THE ENTIRE RISK AS TO THE QUALITY AND PERFORMANCE OF THE
PROGRAM IS WITH YOU. SHOULD THE PROGRAM PROVE DEFECTIVE,
YOU ASSUME THE COST OF ALL NECESSARY SERVICING, REPAIR OR
CORRECTION”. The Mozilla Public License2 contains similar clause. Such dis-
claimers often come together with the lack of a contractual binding maintenance
model. Thus, when using FOSS, one needs to decide how this can be mitigated.
This can be done either by entering a commercial agreement with a company that
offers support for FOSS components [57], or by investing into the in-house mainte-
nance. The lack of documentation in FOSS projects [16, 153] may prevent in-house
developers from learning, thus increasing potential maintenance costs.
4. Proprietary software vendors are often unable to influence development processes and
patch release policies of consumed FOSS components [153], which may complicate
maintenance tasks in case vendors have to provide own support for the components.
Given that vulnerability patching is prioritized among other maintenance tasks [13],
it is nearly impossible to establish the equilibrium between patch releases in FOSS
components and updates of versions used by proprietary vendors (see [34] for a
discussion).
5. In particular, security response processes for proprietary software often try to release
detailed information about a vulnerability only after a patch was released. The goals
are to provide customers a safety period to patch their systems before a vulnerability
gets publicly known as well as not publishing fixes that can be transformed into zero
day vulnerabilities for the previous versions of the product. This might conflict,
on one hand with FOSS licenses that require to contribute changes back to the
community and, on the other hand, with security response processes set up by the
FOSS projects – publishing a security patch in the source code form can be considered
as making a vulnerability publicly known (see [130]).
Some of the above aspects are based on empirical studies that are already five to ten
years old. As in the last decade the awareness of software security increased both in FOSS
development, as well as in proprietary software industry, there is a risk that not all of the
findings are still applicable. For example, many larger FOSS projects nowadays support
2https://www.mozilla.org/en-US/MPL/2.0/
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confidential reporting of security issues, as well as responsible patching and disclosure
processes. Thus, for such projects, the aspect (4) may be less of an issue.
There are also indirect consequences of the freedoms and additional opportunities
provided by FOSS licenses. For example, if the maintenance model of a proprietary
component does not fit the needs of consuming software product, one needs to negotiate
a custom support contract, or search for alternative offerings. FOSS components provide
at least two additional opportunities:
1. Apart from the original developers of a FOSS project, there may be other companies
that can offer commercial support and bug fixes. Thus, it is possible to select between
different maintenance offerings for the same component.
2. As the source code is available and modifications are allowed (under certain condi-
tions), one can fix issues independently from the developers of a FOSS component.
Unfortunately, these opportunities also lead to certain risks (see, for example, points
(3) and (4) above).
2.3 Certification and Empirical Assessment of Third-party
Software
2.3.1 Selection and Integration of FOSS components
There exist numerous works [16, 45, 77, 102, 153] that investigate various aspects of open
source software components lifecycle, including scenarios when these components are in-
tegrated into (or re-used by) proprietary applications, as well as discuss the importance
of FOSS for the modern software development [9, 58, 89,104].
Stol and Babar [153] perform a systematic literature review of scientific publications
to identify challenges in integrating open source components into proprietary software
products. The authors identified that among the main challenges there are the product
selection, the lack of comprehensive information, and maintenance considerations. For
instance, insufficient documentation may interfere with the developers’ ability to learn
how to use a component, and the lack of time for performing a thorough evaluation of
a component may cause additional problems in the future (including security). Addi-
tionally, weak community and lack of support for a FOSS component may result into
additional expenses for a company that is using this component. Earlier, Merilinna and
Matinlassi [102] provided an overview of practices for combining open source integration
techniques. The authors [102] also point out that the lack of proper documentation is a
big challenge of adopting FOSS.
Ayala et al. [16] performed an interview within several software companies, and report
their findings about how these companies collect information about FOSS components.
They identified that they are often selected based on the previous experience, even without
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considering alternatives. Thus, according to the study [16], experience was one of the key
factors for the component evaluation. Also, according to the results of their interview,
some developers mentioned that insufficient documentation within many FOSS projects
is indeed a significant problem.
Often, the decision about integration of a FOSS component is made after an appropri-
ate candidate is evaluated against a certain set of criteria. Since every software vendor
(or a development team) may have its own set of evaluation criteria, this process may be
completely ad-hoc [102, 153], or being constantly revised, and, therefore, differ not only
from company to company, but even from case to case.
To tackle the problem, researchers proposed various selection and evaluation models
for FOSS. Ahmad and Laplante [5] proposed a systematic approach for evaluating open
source software against a set of factors that include functionality, licensing, evolution
speed, longevity, community, quality of documentation and support. Aiming to answer
the question “which factors are considered for open source software selection?”, they
developed a framework that simplifies the decision making process for humans. For vali-
dating their method, the authors performed a survey with human participants, indicating
that functionality was the most important selection factor, according to their responses.
However, the approach does not consider any properties of FOSS projects relevant to
software security.
Wheeler [166] described a generic process for evaluating open source software, which
is based on identifying proper candidates, gathering information about the candidates
(reading reviews), and analyzing the shortlist of candidates in more depth. The important
factors to consider include functionality, market attributes, support and maintenance,
various quality attributes, security and legal aspects. For assessing the security, the
author proposed to use static analysis tools (such as Coverity and Fortify), vulnerability
reports, as well as the common criteria evaluation. While using various tools for security
code analyses is a common industrial practice [29], it may be very difficult to perform it
for a large number of FOSS components (see Problem 2 in Chapter 1).
Several works [5, 14, 15, 139, 140] are focused on the overall software quality and func-
tionality as the main selection criteria, with little or no emphasis on software security.
Ardagna et al. [10] proposed FOCSE - the framework for selecting FOSS components that
provides security-related functionality. This framework is based on the set of features of
FOSS projects that could be aggregated and weighted, providing a unified qualitative
measure. Some of these features may be only obtained having a privileged access to the
development information. The approach is suitable for making a decision between several
security-related FOSS projects, as well as for making a choice between other types of
projects. However, it does not include any explicit security metrics that would help to
reason about the security of a FOSS project itself.
Samoladas et al. [139] proposed a model that supports automated software evalua-
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tion, specifically targeted on open source. The set of metrics considered by the model
is represented by the code quality metrics (including security), and community quality
metrics (mailing list, documentation and developer base). While this model takes secu-
rity into account, it comprises of only two variables: “null dereferences” and “undefined
values”. This limitation was a deliberate choice of the authors [139] in order to facilitate
the automation of the metrics collection process.
Del Bianco et al. [51] developed QualiPSo - the methodology for assessing the FOSS
development processes. Instead of providing measures for selecting or integrating FOSS
components, it aims for providing FOSS developers with metrics that could be used to
assess and improve the quality of their projects, increasing the trustworthiness between
FOSS projects and their potential consumers.
Wheeler and Khakimov [167] published a white paper that describes the Census 3
project of Core Infrastructure Initiative. The authors describe a set of publicly available
metrics that should be considered for identifying important (for their set of features)
projects that have security problems due to the lack of resources (investments, developers).
While this methodology cannot be directly used for FOSS project comparison, it provides
an interesting set of metrics and insights that are worth to be considered when selecting
open source components for consumption from the security point of view.
2.3.2 Empirical Assessment of Vulnerabilities
An extensive body of research explores the applicability of various metrics for estimating
the number of bugs and security vulnerabilities of a software component. Apart from
factors that characterize the overall quality, security, and liveness of software projects,
software development companies that are using these projects could employ various pre-
diction approaches from the literature for assessing the security status of a FOSS project.
The simplest such factor is time (since release), and the corresponding model is a
Vulnerability Discovery Model. Massacci and Nguyen [96] provide a comprehensive survey
and independent empirical validation of several vulnerability discovery models. Several
other metrics have been used: code complexity metrics [113, 145, 146], developer activity
metrics [25,145], static analysis defect densities [163], frequencies of occurrence of specific
programming constructs [141, 164], etc. We illustrate some representative cases with
Table 2.1.
Although our focus are security vulnerabilities that may stand aside from generic soft-
ware bugs (e.g., errors in functionality), Ozment [120] showed that methods for estimating
trends in generic bugs used in software engineering literature can be also applied for se-
curity vulnerabilities.
The works by Ostrand et al. [118] and Bell et al. [25] aimed on predicting files in new
3https://www.coreinfrastructure.org/programs/census-project
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Table 2.1: Vulnerability and bug prediction approaches
We provide a brief overview of various approaches for bug prediction in the existing literature (we refer the
reader to [71] and [125] for a more complete discussion).
Paper Predictors Bug data Predicted vars
Ostrand et al. [118] Bug and change
histories of files
Internal data on previous re-
leases of a commercial system
Files with largest
bug concentration
Nagappan & Ball [109] Relative Code churn Internal defect dataset (Win-
dows Server 2003)
Bug density
Shin & Williams [146] Complexity metrics MFSA, NVD, Bugzilla Vulnerable
functions
Nguyen & Tran [113] Member and
Component depen-
dency graphs,
Complexity metrics
MFSA, NVD Vulnerable
functions
Shin et al. [145] Complexity metrics,
Code churn,
Developer activity
MFSA, Red Hat Linux package
manager
Vulnerable files
Walden & Doyle [163] Static analysis
vulnerability density
NVD Number of
vulnerabilities
Bell et al. [25] Developer metrics Internal data on previous re-
leases of a commercial system
Files with largest
bug concentration
Massacci & Nguyen [96] Known
vulnerabilities
MFSA, NVD, Bugzilla, Mi-
crosoft Security Bulletin, Apple
Knowledge Base, Chrome Issue
Tracker
Number of
vulnerabilities
Scandriato et al. [141] Frequencies of prog.
constructs
SAST warnings (Fortify SCA) Vulnerable files
Walden et al. [164] Complexity metrics,
Frequencies of prog.
constructs
NVD, Security notes from a
project
Vulnerable files
releases of software projects that may have the largest concentration of bugs, so that
they can be prioritized for testing. The work by Ostrand et al. [118] considered bug
modification histories of files in previous releases, while the follow-up study by Bell et
al. [25] used the information about individual developers: the authors of both studies had
access to the industrial systems of the same vendor that they used for evaluating their
work. The authors of [25] find evidence that prediction capabilities of the previous model
in [118] improve when adding the cumulative number of developers as an additional factor.
Nagappan and Ball [109] evaluated code churn metrics for predicting bug densities in
software, showing that metrics taken from development history can be a good predictor
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for the largest clusters of generic software bugs.
Shin and Williams [146] evaluated software complexity metrics for identifying vul-
nerable functions. The authors collected information about vulnerabilities in Mozilla
JavaScript Engine (JSE) from Mozilla Foundation Security Advisories (MFSA)4, and
showed that nesting complexity could be an important factor to consider. The authors
indicate that their approach had a small number of false positives, but at the cost of
having false negatives. In a follow-up work, Shin et al. [145] also analyzed several de-
veloper activity metrics showing that poor developer collaboration can potentially lead
to vulnerabilities, and that complexity metrics alone are not sufficient for vulnerability
prediction. Similarly to [109], the authors of [145] suggest that code churn metrics are
better indicators for approximate locations of vulnerabilities than complexity.
Nguyen and Tran [113] built a vulnerability prediction model using dependency graphs
as intermediate representation of software, and applying machine learning techniques to
train the predictor. They used several static analysis tools for computing source code
metrics, and tools for extracting dependency information from the source code, adding
this information to the graphs that represent a software application. To validate the
approach, the authors analyzed Mozilla JSE. In comparison to [146], the model had a
slightly bigger number of false positives, but less false negatives.
Walden and Doyle [163] used static analysis for predicting web application security
risks. They measured the static analysis vulnerability density (SAVD) metric across ver-
sion histories of five PHP web applications, which is calculated as the number of warnings
issued by the Fortify SCA5 tool per one thousand lines of code. The authors performed
multiple regression analyses using the SAVD values for different severity levels as explana-
tory variables, and the post-release vulnerability density as the response variable, showing
that the SAVD metric could be a potential predictor for the number of new vulnerabilities.
Scandriato et al. [141] proposed to use a machine learning approach, mining source code
of Android components and tracking the occurrences of specific patterns. The authors
used the Fortify SCA tool as the source of ground truth: if the tool issues a warning
about a file, this file is considered to be vulnerable. However, it may not be the case as
static analysis tools can have many false positives, and authors verified manually only the
alerts for 2 applications out of 20. The results show that the approach had good precision
and recall when used for prediction within a single project. Walden et al. [164] confirmed
that the vulnerability prediction technique based on text mining (described in [141]) could
be more accurate than models based on software metrics. They have collected a dataset
of PHP vulnerabilities for three open source web applications by mining the National
Vulnerability Database (NVD) and security announcements of those applications. They
have built two prediction models: (1) a model that predicts potentially vulnerable files
4https://www.mozilla.org/en-US/security/advisories/
5http://www8.hp.com/us/en/software-solutions/static-code-analysis-sast/
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based on source code metrics; and (2) model that uses the occurrence of terms in a PHP
file and machine learning. The analysis shows that their machine learning model had
better precision and recall than the code metrics model, however, it is applicable only for
scripting languages (and must be additionally adjusted for languages other than PHP).
The biggest challenge in applying the results of empirical research in general, as well as
empirical research that aims on security vulnerabilities, is the availability of the informa-
tion that can be used to for evaluation of various heuristics or methods - the ground truth
data. In particular, choosing the right source of vulnerability information is crucial, as
any vulnerability prediction approach highly depends on the accuracy and completeness
of the information in these sources. Massacci and Nguyen [95] addressed the question of
selecting the right source of ground truth for vulnerability analysis. The authors of [95]
show that different vulnerability features are often scattered across vulnerability databases
and discuss problems that are present in these sources. Additionally, the authors provide
a study on Mozilla Firefox vulnerabilities. Their example shows that if a vulnerability
prediction approach is using only one source of vulnerability data (e.g., MFSA), it would
actually miss an important number of vulnerabilities that are present in other sources
such as the NVD. Of course, the same should be true also for the cases when only the
NVD is used as the ground truth source for predicting vulnerabilities.
2.4 The Economic Impact of Security Maintenance
The cost of general software maintenance is well investigated in the literature. Banker
and Slaughter investigated how software maintenance in organizations can be improved
to achieve economical benefits [22]. They find support for the hypothesis that software
maintenance can be characterized by scale economies, grounded on the observation that a
significant part of the maintenance effort spent by developers is understanding the software
to be modified (or patched) [21,59]. Several other software maintenance models considered
the developers’ familiarity with the software as an important factor as well [20,21,35].
The maintenance of software components from security economic perspective is rela-
tively unexplored. Previous research on software economics focused on different choices
such as, for example, buying a component versus building it from scratch [42], consider-
ing trade-offs between component costs and system’s requirements [41], or optimizing the
coupling and cohesion characteristics of component-based systems [88].
The major focus of the software engineering research so far has been on predicting soft-
ware vulnerabilities (see [96]) and the security choices for different maintenance (patching)
strategies. Stol and Babar described the challenges of integrating FOSS components into
proprietary software, according to the past literature [153]. They identify maintenance
among the most important challenges, suggesting that there may be no immediate costs
while selecting FOSS components, but costs will eventually emerge during the consump-
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tion phase as the natural phenomenon of deteriorating software.
The consumption costs of FOSS components can be generated by delays due to software
incompatibility of a newer version of a component with the target application, component
failures (which imply reputation costs as well), maintenance of older versions of compo-
nents, and creating patches [157]. Specifically, security patches that a proprietary vendor
has to apply and distribute to end customers require significant increase in vendor’s soft-
ware maintenance efforts [20, 22]. There could be various other reasons why security
patches provided by FOSS developers cannot be applied effortlessly: for instance, due to
large number of vulnerabilities being disclosed periodically,6 or the fact that third-party
security patches should be additionally verified, or the patch has to be applied for all sup-
ported versions of a proprietary application that relies on potentially unsupported version
of a third-party component being patched.
Conceptually, there is a distinction between consumers – parties that are using the
software, and providers – development teams or organizations that provide the software
and support it. For instance, the security patch management model by Cavusoglu et
al. [34] specifies the costs of a consumer that emerge due to potential security damage
(not applying a patch in time) and update (identifying, testing, and installing patches).
According to the model, the providers’ costs are generated by patch release (developing
and shipping a patch) and reputation losses (vulnerabilities exploited before patches are
released). This implies different types of costs for different parties, however, for our
scenario, a proprietary software vendor would have to bear all these costs. This is because
such vendors are consumers with respect to FOSS components, and, at the same time,
they are providers with respect to their end customers (as FOSS components are bundled
with original applications).
6For example, the study by Eric Rescorla [130] suggests that vulnerability discovery/fix rates for software projects do
not decrease through their lifetime.
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An Exploratory Case Study at a
Large Software Vendor
In this chapter we report on the exploratory case study that we performed at the premises
of a large software vendor. The study aimed to explore the current approach and experi-
ence of our industrial partner in integrating FOSS components securely into its software
supply chain, as well as to identify the most urgent problems that require attention. We
describe the secure software development process used by our industrial partner and the
place of FOSS components within this process, the selection and consumption of FOSS
components, and discuss the relative importance of security maintenance of such compo-
nents.
3.1 Introduction
The integration of FOSS components into products of proprietary software vendors is a
complex problem that spans different issues at development and maintenance steps. For
instance, at development time, development teams must ensure that FOSS components
adhere to the same standard as a typical vendor’s product.
To this end, our aim was to understand the role of FOSS components within the soft-
ware supply chain of a large proprietary software vendor. We followed Yin [169] as a
guidance on conducting case studies for performing our study. Various techniques exist
for knowledge elicitation [76], and structured and semi-structured interviews are consid-
ered to be among the most important sources of information [169]. We used purposive
sampling [70] while performing informal discussions with developers, and members of Se-
curity Testing and Maintenance teams. We conducted a case study at the premises of our
industrial partner for exploring the following questions:
1. What is the actual secure software development process of an industrial company,
how is it managed, and what is the place of FOSS components within this process?
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2. How are FOSS components selected for consumption, and which are the roles and
activities involved in the choice and integration of FOSS components?
3. How is security maintenance of FOSS components managed, and what is its relative
importance for the software supply chain of our industrial partner?
A total period of 15 months was spent by the author of this dissertation on the premises
of our industrial partner, including 12 months at the Research Lab, and 3 months with
the Security Testing team at the main headquarters. During the latter time period, the
author of this dissertation worked closely with Dr. Achim D. Brucker, who at that time
had been a member of the Central Security Testing team for 8 years.
We collected notes, memos, and emails. We could not hold formally recorded in-
terviews, as they would require an extremely heavy and lengthy authorization process
through the legal department.
We were also making internal presentations to validate our insights, and to capture
the variety of roles and activities related to the secure integration and consumption of
FOSS components for our industrial partner at that time. Dr. Brucker, being the “key
informant” in Yin’s terminology [169], suggested the participants of these meetings, and
provided the necessary introductions and background details to the participants. The
set of participants consisted of interested software developers and security researchers,
employed by our industrial partner. During that time period, we also had an opportu-
nity to present parts of this work to a much broader audience of software developers at
the yearly development kick-off meeting, organized by our industrial partner internally.
During this meeting, we had in-depth discussions with software developers who confirmed
our understanding of the FOSS integration and maintenance problems of our industrial
partner, and allowed us to define our further steps.
3.2 Secure Software Development Lifecycle
The first finding concerns the secure software development process and the place of FOSS
components within it. From what we understood during our meetings with members of the
Central Security Team, our industrial partner follows a Security Development Lifecycle
(SDL) process1, the main steps of which are split into the following phases:
• Preparation: this phase consists of activities related to security awareness trainings
for developers and team managers. One of the purposes of these activities is to raise
awareness for security implications of using third-party FOSS components during
product development.
• Risk Identification: development teams, together with the local security experts,
1This SDL is only one example of a security development lifecycle, and our study is not specific to this particular security
development process. For example, it is similarly applicable to Microsoft’s SDL [78].
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organize various threat modeling activities. The goal of these activities is to identify
potential application-specific risks of all third-party components (including FOSS)
and their attack surfaces.
• Development: this phase includes activities of planning the development of a new
product (or a new product version). In particular, it covers:
– Planning of Security Measures, which describes the mitigation of the previously
identified security risks. For example, it also includes the security testing plan
that describes a product specific, risk-based security testing strategy that ensures
that the security measures are implemented correctly. This security measures
plan needs to cover both in-house development and all kinds of third-party com-
ponents.
– Secure Development, using defensive implementation strategies such as secure
code guidelines and implementation best practices. While this step is mostly
focused on the in-house development, third-party components might influence it
as well (e.g., developers might consider to limit the usage of potentially insecure
interfaces of third-party components). Moreover, for FOSS components the same
techniques (e.g., static code analysis) could be used for the security assessment.
– Security Testing, which ensures that the planned security measures (including
defensive implementation strategies) are implemented and are effective in pre-
venting security threats.
• Transition: this phase is performed by the Security Validation team, which is an
independent control entity that acts like the first customer, and performs security
assessment of the final product. Depending on the previous risk assessment, this may
include architectural security analyses, code reviews, or penetration testing. Any
security issues found during this step, regardless whether they are in own coding or
third-party components, need to be fixed before the actual shipment.
• Utilization: during this phase, the Security Response team handles the communica-
tion with customers and external security researchers about reported vulnerabilities,
as well as ensures that development and maintenance teams fix the reported issues
(including down-ports to all supported releases and all their third-party components
as required by the support agreements).
According to the SDL process defined by our industrial partner, the secure consumption
of FOSS components requires attention in all its phases. However, applying standard
secure development procedures to all FOSS components (for instance, performing static
code analyses) requires solid understanding of the source code, the architecture, and
the use case of each FOSS component – which may be costly for a large number of
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FOSS components (see [29] for further details on applying static analysis in the industry).
Therefore, our industrial partner is exploring risk-based security assessment approach as
a part of the secure development activities (see [19] for example), which motivated the
work carried out in this dissertation. The risk-based approach would, for instance, favor
the search for the factors that help to estimate the security risk and the maintenance
effort associated with the consumption of particular FOSS components, that are easier to
obtain and to assess.
Figure 3.1: Descriptive statistics of FOSS components used or requested by internal projects
The two figures characterize the sample of the most popular 166 FOSS projects used and requested by different
internal projects of our industrial partner: the figure on the left illustrates the sample in terms of the size of the
code base implemented in a specific programming language, while the figure on the right illustrates the distribution
of the number of usages/requests of FOSS components.
(a) The prevalence of programming languages in components
Java ( 40%)
C++ ( 30%)
PHP ( 13%)
C ( 10%)
JavaScript ( 5%)
Other ( 2%)
(b) The number of integrations of a component
0
50
10
0
15
0
20
0
25
0
30
0
#I
nt
er
n
a
l p
ro
jec
ts
Java non−Java
In order to understand the role of FOSS components in the development process of
our industrial partner, we collected data for 166 most popular FOSS projects that were
requested by developers of internal projects as components during the last five years2.
We learned that the number of FOSS components per product may vary: for example,
while traditional ERP systems written in proprietary languages (e.g., ABAP or People-
Code) usually do not contain many FOSS components, the situation is quite the opposite
for recent cloud offerings, such as the ones based on OpenStack3 or Cloud Foundry4. As
we can see from Figure 3.1, FOSS components are integrated into (or requested for inte-
gration by) a large number of projects of our industrial partner. Figure 3.1a illustrates
2This information is publicly available and can be reconstructed from the bill of materials of individual projects found
on the web community of the vendor (although, it was significantly easier to collect this information using the internal
sources).
3https://www.openstack.org/
4https://www.cloudfoundry.org/
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the cumulative size of the code bases of the components in the sample broken down by dif-
ferent programming languages in which they were implemented: the distribution suggests
that the largest code base corresponds to Java.
Figure 3.1b shows the distributions of the number of internal projects that are using
(or have requested) a FOSS component from the sample, divided by Java and non-Java
components: these distributions also suggest the prevalence of Java-based components in
comparison to non-Java components. To verify this difference, we used non-parametric
Wilcoxon test, since the data that we collected is not normally distributed (Shapiro-Wilk
test returned p < 0.05), and it contains unpaired samples. The results of Wilcoxon
test confirmed that Java-based components are indeed more used (or requested) by the
developers of our industrial partner in comparison to the others: the two distributions
have small-to-medium and statistically significant difference (p < 0.05, Cohen’s d = 0.44).
Table 3.1: Popular Java projects used by our industrial partner
Our communications with our industrial partner allowed us to identify several Java projects that we felt to be
among the most interesting and challenging ones when they are to be integrated (or are already integrated) as
components.
Project
Total
commits
Age
(years)
Avg.
commits
(per year)
Total
contributors
Current
size
(KLoC)
Total
CVEs
Apache Tomcat (v6-9) 15730 10.0 1784 30 883 65
Apache ActiveMQ 9264 10.3 896 96 1151 15
Apache Camel 22815 9.0 2551 398 959 7
Apache Cxf 11965 8.0 1500 107 657 16
Spring Framework 12558 7.6 1646 416 997 8
Jenkins 23531 7.4 2493 1665 505 56
Apache Derby 7940 10.7 742 36 689 4
Table 3.1 describes several popular (both externally and internally) Java projects that
we are allowed to directly disclose. Our communications with developers of our industrial
partner suggested that these projects are among the most interesting and challenging
ones when they are to be integrated (or are already integrated) as components. For each
project, the table lists various characteristics that describe its popularity and size, as well
as the number of historical vulnerabilities that affect different versions of Java sources.
3.3 FOSS Components Approval Processes
To address the second question that concerns the processes for selection of FOSS com-
ponents, we identified how this selection is managed, and which are the critical roles and
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activities connected which the selection process.
Our industrial partner has formal processes in place for integration of third-party
FOSS components into its products (inbound approval), as well as for releasing their own
software products as FOSS, and contributing to already existing FOSS projects (outbound
approval). These processes are similar to the inbound and outbound approval processes
described by Goldman and Gabriel [65, Chapter 7]: they also start with legal and business
case checks, as well as identification and assessment of various risks. These risks may
include potential intellectual property infringement, possible lack of support from FOSS
communities, and the quality of the source code and the corresponding documentation
that is intended as a contribution to FOSS communities. Additionally, our industrial
partner has implemented checks for potential security risks for both processes.
Typically, both inbound and outbound approval processes require vast expert knowl-
edge, therefore for different phases of these processes different experts may be involved:
for instance, the security checks are mostly carried out by the Central Security Team,
while legal checks are performed by the legal department. However, all phases of both
inbound and outbound processes may be carried out by the same experts (or teams of
experts), as there is no strict requirement that they should be separated.
3.3.1 Outbound FOSS Approval Process
The outbound process is started when a product group either wants to release a component
using a FOSS license, or to contribute to a FOSS project. This process includes, among
others:
• Legal and license check: is the license chosen to publish the product compatible with
the dependencies and/or the license of the project to which the contribution will be
made?
• Business case check: can this contribution under a FOSS license be justified from a
business perspective? Are the interactions with the FOSS communities well defined?
Are there internal resources for the maintenance and support?
• Security check: does this contribution comply to the Product Security Standard5?
It must have the same level of security assurance as the rest of the products, since
its quality directly reflects on the company.
3.3.2 Inbound FOSS Approval Process
The inbound process is started by software product groups that intend to integrate a FOSS
component in the product they are developing. They must perform a request and specify
how the component will be integrated, as well as which functionality of the component
will be used. Among other activities, this process includes the following:
5See Brucker and Sodan [29] for more information about the Product Security Standard used by our industrial partner.
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• Legal and license check: is the license of a FOSS component compliant to the license
of a product into which it is integrated? Are all requirements of the license (e.g.,
contributing patches back to the community) understood and documented?
• Business case check: what is the significance of the technology that will be inte-
grated? Are there viable alternatives? How this technology will be distributed and
maintained? In comparison to the outbound approval process, the business case check
here is more lightweight.
• Security check: does the component comply to the Product Security Standard? Are
there unpatched security vulnerabilities that may affect customers? Are the security
patches provided by the FOSS developers in a timely manner?
Yet, with respect to the inbound FOSS approval process, security checks are an ingredi-
ent, but not the main decision point. First, certain FOSS components may be the de-facto
standard (e.g., Apache Hadoop6 for big data), so that the end customers of our industrial
partner may expect them to be used. Second, FOSS components may offer functionalities
that are very expensive to re-implement, so FOSS it is the most economical choice [90],
and there might be only one FOSS component with the desired functionality to choose
from. Finally, a component that is better in terms of security in comparison to the similar
ones, may not fit because of a restrictive license.
3.3.3 Security Checks Revisited
For both inbound and outbound approval processes, it is required to perform security
checks for ensuring that the FOSS component adheres to the same standard as the rest
of the products of our industrial partner. This is rather easy to achieve for FOSS con-
tributions (outbound), as this code was being developed by the internal developers using
the SDL. In contrast, for the consumed third-party FOSS components, assessing the
compliance to the Product Security Standard is difficult, as development teams usually
have very limited knowledge about the (secure) development process used to develop a
FOSS component and, moreover, often lack detailed knowledge about the actual imple-
mentation. Still, to ensure the security of the products offered by our industrial partner,
including consumed FOSS components, the general guidance is to treat third-party FOSS
components as own coding with respect to security.
Since 2010, static application security testing (SAST) is widely used by the developers
of our industrial partner (we refer to Brucker and Sodan [29] for more details), and there
is a number of SAST tools used in the industry as a whole (such as HP Fortify7, Synopsis
Coverity8, or Checkmarx9) as a part of the inbound approval process by development
6https://hadoop.apache.org/
7http://www.fortify.com
8http://www.coverity.com
9http://www.checkmarx.com
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teams that request FOSS components. If the analysis of findings of SAST tools shows
that there are exploitable vulnerabilities, mitigation measures are put in place. The latter
could, for instance, result in developing a fix for the FOSS component, or implementing
certain usage restrictions (or workarounds) such as white-listing of user input before it
reaches the FOSS component. As the analysis of SAST results requires a solid under-
standing of the source code, the architecture and the use case of the FOSS component
under analysis, the requirement to statically analyze all FOSS components is a big burden
to the development teams.
3.4 FOSS Maintenance And Response
After we identified how the choice of FOSS components is carried out, our final task
was to understand the relative importance of the security maintenance of chosen FOSS
components, as well as how the maintenance is managed.
The maintenance activities have a significant economic impact that is often not per-
ceived by the “lay users”, as they are used to the “monthly upgrade” process of web
browsers and their plug-ins. Large-scale enterprise software, such as ERP systems, or
industrial control systems are the back-bone of the businesses and, thus, enterprise soft-
ware customers are often rather conservative in upgrading (or replacing) their on-premise
software solutions.
Figure 3.2 shows the distribution of customers, as of 2014, of a large on-premise pro-
prietary product: the y-axis shows the number of customers (systems), and the x-axis
shows the year in which a certain version of the software was released: most customers
were using systems that are between eleven and nine years old. To meet the demands
of the customers, our industrial partner offers support and maintenance, and for selected
products – mainstream support for a number of years and, additional, customer-specific
extended maintenance for several additional years. Thus, all third-party components (in-
cluding FOSS) must be as well supported with security fixes for the same amount of
time.
As customers expect support and maintenance for the complete software solution, our
industrial partner must also ensure maintenance for all integrated third-party components.
This includes security fixes for all such components that require to upgrade or modify
the product (resulting in a security upgrade or a patch that fixes, e.g., Heartbleed10 or
POODLE11), but also issuing articles and security notes that inform customers about
fixing security issues in the environment their system is operated on (e.g., recommending
upgrades of a Linux distribution that customers might use to operate the system).
For pure cloud offerings (e.g., Software-as-a-Service), the situation can be the opposite:
10http://heartbleed.com/
11https://www.oracle.com/technetwork/topics/security/poodlecve-2014-3566-2339408.html
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The distribution (as of 2014) shows #systems (blue) and #customers (red) using the releases of an ERP application
that are released in the year x (values on the y-axis are omitted for confidentiality). In 2014, most customers used
versions (and corresponding FOSS components) that were between 9 and 11 years old.
Figure 3.2: ERP application releases and #customers still using them
cloud offerings usually have rapid release-cycle and, thus, do not require a long mainte-
nance phase – it is more important here whether a consumed third-party component can
be upgraded easily.
As integrated FOSS components may be heavily modified or merged into the code
base of the in-house software products (or integrated prior to the existence of a software
inventory), there exists a problem of identifying the FOSS components that are used
across the software portfolio. For instance, the study by Davies et al. [50] discusses the
importance of identification of open source Java components, as well as proposes effective
heuristics to identify them.
To mitigate this problem, our industrial partner has a FOSS component inventory,
which was created using the Black Duck12 solution. We learned that developers of our
industrial partner use the high-level information provided by this solution and similar
sources to learn about characteristics of FOSS components and make decisions about
them. This information is easily available (at least internally), and contains data such
as the age of a FOSS project, the information about its historical vulnerabilities (mostly
taken from the NVD), and various cumulative data that can be extracted (not without an
effort) from the source code repositories of these projects: the current size of their code
bases, the number of contributors, commits, and similar. We as well used this software
inventory to extract the data on the most popular FOSS projects that we discussed in
Section 3.2.
Table 3.2 summarizes the vulnerability types reported for these FOSS components in
the National Vulnerability Database (NVD). This distribution suggests that the most
prevalent historical vulnerability type is denial of service – the absence of such vulnera-
12http://www.blackduck.com
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Table 3.2: Historical vulnerabilities of 166 FOSS components
The table shows the distribution of historical vulnerability types in the sample of the most popular FOSS projects
used or requested by our industrial partner. The distribution suggests that denial of service was the most prevalent
vulnerability – the absence of such vulnerabilities is critical for business software solutions.
Vulnerability type Portion Vulnerability type Portion
Denial of Service 30.8% Gain Privileges 3.1%
Code execution 20.3% Directory Traversal 2.4%
Overflow 16.6% Memory Corruption 2.2%
Bypass Something 10.3% CSRF 0.9%
Gain Information 7.1% HTTP response splitting 0.3%
XSS 5.9% SQL injection 0.1%
bilities is critical for business software solutions that must be constantly available online.
Also, vulnerabilities of this type may be particularly hard to identify with conventional
static analysis [36]. Given the numbers of internal projects that use and request FOSS
components, the problem of their security maintenance becomes of great importance.
3.5 Preliminary Findings
Our discussions with software developers, security and maintenance experts of our indus-
trial partner allowed us to identify the heuristics and best practices that development
teams and product owners are following to support secure integration of FOSS compo-
nents into their software supply chain. We base our further line of work on some of these
insights, however we do not deal with most of the organizational measures.
We split these findings into the following two parts: (1) a checklist for product own-
ers and developers that they follow both when selecting a FOSS component, and when
integrating the component into a software product, and (2) organizational and process
improvements that provide the overall environment for using FOSS securely.
3.5.1 FOSS Integration and Maintenance Checklist
We have identified the following points that our industrial partner considers for secure
selection of FOSS components (inbound FOSS approval process that we describe in Section
3.3.2), as well as for integration with new or existing software products when considering
future maintenance (the utilization phase of the SDL process that we describe in Section
3.2):
• How widely is a component used within the software portfolio of our industrial part-
ner? Those components that have been already used in some products require lower
effort, as licensing checks are already done, and internal technical expertise can be
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tapped. Thus, the effort for fixing issues or integrating new versions can be shared
across multiple development teams.
• Are the technologies used in a FOSS project familiar to the development teams?
Similarly to the above point, if there exists an internal technical expertise in certain
programming languages, frameworks, and development processes, it can be re-used
for lowering the effort of integration and future support of a FOSS component.
• What is the maintenance lifecycle used by the FOSS components? It may be impor-
tant to consider the planned support for FOSS components provided by their own
developers. For example, if the security maintenance support provided by the FOSS
community “outlives” the planned maintenance lifecycle of the consuming propri-
etary product, only the integration of minor releases into proprietary releases would
be necessary.
• How active is the FOSS community? Consuming FOSS from active and well-known
FOSS communities (e.g., Apache) should allow development teams to leverage ex-
ternal expertise, as well as to benefit from externally provided security fixes.
• Are FOSS maintainers providing information about security issues and secure devel-
opment processes? Explicit and up-to-date information about security issues in FOSS
projects provided by FOSS maintainers facilitates timely issue resolution for all con-
sumers. The availability of information about security testing processes within FOSS
projects may facilitate external security assessment by consumers: for instance, FOSS
project maintainers may explicitly state that its developers are using certain security
testing tools, such as public offerings from Coverity (http://scan.coverity.com).
• Does a FOSS component have a large number of dependencies? This is a factor that
becomes even more important after a FOSS component was already selected and
integrated, since all such dependencies have to be maintained. Ideally, all the above
considerations should also apply to the transitive closure of dependencies of a FOSS
component that is to be integrated.
Additional elements, such as license compatibility, or requests from customers that need
integration with their code are also important. However, we do not consider them in this
study. Licenses follow different principles and can be a separate subject for a dissertation
in business and law. For further discussion on alliances for software production see [159],
or [134] on legal issues and licensing models.
3.5.2 FOSS Organizational and Process Measures
From an organizational perspective, we have identified the following processes and cam-
paigns that are used by our industrial partner, and are relevant to the goal of secure
integration of FOSS components into the software supply chain:
• FOSS approval processes are defined and used. Clear definition of the approval pro-
27
CHAPTER 3. AN EXPLORATORY CASE STUDY AT A LARGE SOFTWARE VENDOR
cesses that describe the necessary steps for using FOSS components, as well as con-
tributing to FOSS, help to make informed decisions about FOSS components, to
avoid unnecessary risks (e.g., intellectual property, or security), as well as to main-
tain the software inventory that mitigates risks that usually may in the consumption
phase (e.g., security maintenance). These approval processes typically cover at least
the license checks, as well as the security and maintenance checks (inbound), and a
compliance check of the security patch strategy (outbound).
• Software inventory is implemented and is regularly updated. A software inventory
that contains information about FOSS components used and their corresponding
versions allows to track the usage of FOSS components through the entire portfolio
of software products. On the other hand, the absence of such an inventory may lead
to the problems of identifying the components and corresponding versions of these
components that constitute a software product – this significantly complicates timely
resolution of security issues. Ideally, this inventory should be managed automatically,
by analyzing the build system or the binaries of the final product (for instance, using
approaches similar to the work of Davies et al. [50]).
• Vulnerability databases are monitored for new vulnerabilities in used FOSS compo-
nents. Regular monitoring of public vulnerability databases and project-specific vul-
nerability data sources for newly disclosed security vulnerabilities in the consumed
FOSS components allows to identify the information that can be used by developers
to timely fix security issues. This also allows to timely inform customers about rel-
evant security issues in third-party FOSS components, so that they can plan their
actions.
• A maintenance strategy that fits the current FOSS usage model is defined and used.
This could range from buying maintenance and support for FOSS components from
third-party vendors, to applying local maintenance when a team that is consuming
a FOSS component is responsible for resolving security issues in them, or to intro-
ducing a centralized maintenance model for the entire company, or a mixture of the
aforementioned options. Having a clear maintenance strategy helps to save precious
development resources. We base the maintenance models that we discuss in Chapter
6 on this insight. Additionally, a maintenance strategy needs to have particular focus
on applying security fixes in timely manner (e.g., down-porting fixes, or upgrading),
as discovery of new vulnerabilities is close to impossible to plan beforehand. Another
important issue that emerged is that there exists a possibility that FOSS components
will be maintained and supported in-house exclusively (e.g., due to the lack of sup-
port from FOSS developers). Therefore, accessing these components in the source
code form may be more preferable.
• An awareness campaign about FOSS components is run. Regular internal seminars
or trainings for developers and product owners on FOSS components, that explain
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the open source software licenses, as well as the associated implications for the effort
of secure integration and maintenance may help to ensure that the above processes
are running as effective as possible.
3.6 Conclusions
The main goal of this study was to identify the current status of handling FOSS compo-
nents within the software supply chain of our industrial partner, as well as to identify the
most important problems in securing these components that require attention the most.
From our communications with software developers and security experts, we under-
stood that the SDL process of our industrial partner consists of several phases, and that
the security of FOSS components is considered throughout the most of them. While the
SDL process dictates that FOSS components should receive the same treatment in all
these phases with no difference to the in-house coding, this rule is difficult to enforce
due to the lack of in-depth knowledge about every component by the in-house software
developers, and the large number of integrated components and their versions.
We observed that our industrial partner is using inbound and outbound FOSS approval
processes that aim to identify various risks that are relevant to either contributing to
FOSS projects (or releasing in-house coding under an open source software license), or to
integrating FOSS components into own products. These two processes consist mainly of
assessing legal, business, and security risks, and may be carried out by different experts
within the company. Note that for the inbound approval process, the security checks may
be only a part of the FOSS selection problem besides legal and business considerations.
However, the importance of the security characteristics of FOSS components may be-
come more apparent at the utilization phase of the SDL process, specifically, during the
maintenance period of a software product. From what we understood by questioning
developers and software experts, security maintenance of these components (updating
different versions of a product because of security issues in FOSS, or providing a custom
fix) generates a significant amount of effort for developers due to the sheer number of
integrated FOSS components, and their different versions. This is also aggravated by the
potential lack of expertise from the in-house developers on every FOSS component that
is being used.
As we looked at the software maintenance processes of our industrial partner in general,
we understood the utmost importance of the security maintenance of third-party FOSS
components, which can potentially generate significant amount of effort for the in-house
developers and software maintenance experts. Therefore, the goal of minimizing these
efforts throughout the entire software product lifecycle (FOSS approval process, SDL
process, as well as maintenance and support processes) motivated the main problems
that we tackle in this dissertation (we outline them in Chapter 1).
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Chapter 4
TestREx: a Testbed for Repeatable
Exploits1
In this chapter we describe our solution to Problem 1 that lies in understanding whether
existing exploits for disclosed security vulnerabilities can be reproduced in different set-
tings and environments.
4.1 Introduction
Web applications are nowadays one of the preferred ways of providing services to users
and customers. Modern application platforms provide a great deal of flexibility, including
portability of applications between different types of execution environments, e.g., in order
to meet specific cost, performance, and technical needs. However, they are known to suffer
from potentially devastating vulnerabilities, such as flaws in the application design or code,
which allow attackers to compromise data and functionality (for instance, see [156,170]).
Vulnerable web applications are a major target for hackers and cyber attackers [142],
while vulnerabilities are hard to identify by traditional black-box approaches for security
testing [44,94,161].
A key difficulty is that web applications are deployed and run in many different exe-
cution environments, consisting of operating systems, web servers, database engines, and
other sorts of supporting applications in the backend, as well as different configurations in
the frontend [94]. This difficulty can be illustrated with typical exploits for the two types
of web application security vulnerabilities: SQL injection exploits (the success depends
on the capabilities of the underlying database and the authorizations of the user who
runs it [156, Chapter 9]), and Cross-site Scripting (XSS) exploits (the success depends
on a specific web browser being used and its rules for executing or blocking JavaScript
1 This chapter is the result of a joint work with Daniel Ricardo Dos Santos, a fellow PhD student in the SECENTIS
project.
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Table 4.1: Available exploits in TestREx corpus
Language Exploits Source
PHP 83 BugBox [114]
Java 10 WebGoat [119]
Server-side JavaScript 7 Own
code [170, Chapter 14]). Such differences in software environments may transform failed
exploitation attempts into successful ones, and vice versa.
Industrial approaches to black-box application security testing (e.g., IBM AppScan2)
or academic ones (e.g., Secubat [83] and BugBox [114]) require security researchers to
write down a number of specific exploits that can demonstrate the (un)desired behavior.
Information about the configuration is an intrinsic part of the vulnerability description.
Since the operating system and supporting applications in the environment can also have
different versions, this easily escalates to a huge number of combinations which can be
hard to manually deploy and test.
We need a way to automatically switch configurations and re-test exploits to check
whether they work with a different configuration. Such data should also be automatically
collected, so that a researcher can see how different exploits work once the configuration
changes. Such automatic process of “set-up configuration, run exploit, measure result”
was proposed by Allodi et al. [7] for testing exploit kits, but it is not available for testing
web applications.
Our proposed solution, TestREx3, combines packing applications and execution envi-
ronments that can be easily and rapidly deployed, scripted exploits that can be automati-
cally injected, useful reporting and an isolation between running instances of applications
to provide a real “playground” and an experimental setup where security testers and re-
searchers can perform their tests and experiments, and get reports at various levels of
detail.
We also provide a corpus of vulnerable web applications to illustrate the usage of
TestREx over a variety of web programming languages. The exploit corpus is summa-
rized in Table 4.1. Some of the exploits are taken from existing sources (e.g., BugBox [114]
and WebGoat [119]), while others are developed by us. For the latter category, we fo-
cused on server-side JavaScript, because of its growing popularity in both open source
and industrial usage (e.g., Node.js4 and SAP HANA5) and, to the best of our knowledge,
the lack of vulnerability benchmarks.
2http://www.ibm.com/software/products/en/appscan
3http://securitylab.disi.unitn.it/doku.php?id=testrex
4http://nodejs.org/
5https://help.sap.com/hana
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4.2 Related Work
Empirical security research has been recognized as very important in recent years [32,
54, 97]. However, a number of issues should be tackled in order to correctly provide
security experimentation setups. These issues include isolation of the experimental envi-
ronment [7,27,30,114], repeatability of individual experiments [7,54], collection of exper-
imental results, and justification of collected data [97].
The use of a structured testbed can help in achieving greater control over the execu-
tion environment, isolation among experiments, and reproducibility. Most proposals for
security research testbeds focus on the network level (e.g., DETER [27], ViSe [12], and
vGrounds [81]). A comparison of network-based experimental security testbeds can be
found in the Master’s thesis by Stoner [154]. On the application level there are signif-
icantly less experimental frameworks. The BugBox framework [114] is one of them. It
provides the infrastructure for deploying vulnerable PHP-MySQL web applications, cre-
ating exploits and running these exploits against applications in an isolated and easily
customizable environment. As in BugBox, we use the concepts of execution isolation and
environment flexibility. However, we needed to have more variety in software configura-
tions and process those configurations automatically. We have broaden the configurations
scope by implementing software containers for different kinds of web applications, and
automatically deploy them.
The idea of automatically loading a series of clean configurations every time before an
exploit is launched was also proposed by Allodi et al. in their MalwareLab [7]. They load
snapshots of virtual machines that contain clean software environment and then “spoil”
the environment by running exploit kits. This eliminates the undesired cross-influence
between separate experiments and enforces repeatability, so we have incorporated it into
TestREx. For certain scenarios, cross-influence might be a desired behavior, therefore
TestREx makes it possible to run an experiment suite in which the experimenter can
choose to start from a clean environment for each individual exploit/configuration pair or
to reuse the same environment for a group of related exploits.
Maxion and Killourhy [97] have shown the importance of comparative experiments
for software security. It is not enough to just collect the data once, it is also important
to have the possibility to assess the results of the experiment. Therefore, TestREx
includes functionalities for automatically collecting raw statistics on successes and failures
of exploits. We summarize the discussed tools and approaches in Table 4.2.
4.3 Overview of TestREx
TestREx was designed to provide testers with a convenient environment for automated,
large-scale experiments. We believe that TestREx is useful for developers as well. To
33
CHAPTER 4. TESTREX: A TESTBED FOR REPEATABLE EXPLOITS
Table 4.2: Security testing and experimentation tools
The existing tools and approaches provide various functionalities with respect to deployment (e.g., from running
on a local virtual machine to providing controlled environments on real hardware). Most of the security research
testbeds focus on the network level, while on the application level there are significantly less experimental
frameworks.
Tool Description Exploit types
BugBox [114]
A corpus and exploit simulation environment
for PHP web application vulnerabilities.
Selenium and Metasploit
scripts in Python that exploit
PHP application vulnerabili-
ties.
MalwareLab [7]
A controlled environment for experimenting
with malicious software.
Programs that exploit various
software vulnerabilities or mal-
ware kits.
MINESTRONE [56]
A software vulnerability testing framework for
C/C++ programs. The applications are de-
ployed in virtualized environments via Linux
Containers
Programs that exploit memory
corruption, null pointer, num-
ber handling and resource leak
vulnerabilities in C/C++ soft-
ware.
DETER [27]
A testbed facility that consists of a large set
(around 400) of real machines. The resources
infrastructure can be reconfigured on-the-fly
upon request.
Programs that exploit various
software vulnerabilities or mal-
ware kits.
ViSe [12]
A virtual testbed for reproducing and collect-
ing the evidence of security attacks that is
based on VMWare virtualization environment.
Multi-level attacks that include
network tampering and soft-
ware vulnerability exploitation.
SecuBat [83]
Web vulnerability scanner, that automatically
scans live web sites for vulnerabilities using a
web crawler infrastructure.
Specially crafted HTTP re-
quests that exploit SQLi and
XSS vulnerabilities.
vGround [81]
A virtual playground for malware assessment,
that is created on top of a physical infrastruc-
ture - a machine, a cluster or a multi-domain
overlay infrastructure.
Malicious software such as vir-
tual worms or malware kits.
support this claim, we give an example of a possible loophole in a bug fixing workflow of
a hypothetical company:
• A tester finds a bug and opens a new issue in a bug tracking system. She submits it
as a test case described in natural language, explaining all preconditions and steps
needed to reproduce the bug.
• A manager assigns the issue to a developer. In order to pinpoint the source of the
bug and understand how to fix it, the developer must reproduce the test case in his
own setting. If the tester makes a mistake while creating the test case, the developer
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will be unable to trigger the bug. As a consequence, the developer rejects the fix
request.
• In the worst case, it might take a long time before the bug will be re-discovered and
eventually fixed. In a better case, more resources are wasted if the tester has to
re-describe the bug, and a manager has to re-assign the bug to a developer.
Using TestREx, the tester could create an “executable description” of a bug in the
form of a script, and a packed execution environment that allows to instantly replay the
situation that triggered the bug. Despite taking longer for the tester to initially describe
the bug this way, it has many advantages over the natural language approach. First, the
tester and the developer are ensured that the bug can be reproduced. Second, the test
case can be kept as a template on which future tests can be developed, i.e., the first test
is harder to describe, but future tests can reuse parts of the first one. Third, the test can
be automatically added to a library of regression tests, to ensure that the same bug will
be detected if reinserted in future versions of the application.
4.3.1 Terminology
Before we proceed, we introduce several concepts that we use for further discussion6:
• Image – a snapshot of an application configured to run in a certain software environ-
ment (e.g., an operating system, a web server, and a database engine) that includes
the software environment as well. An image can be instantiated into a container that
a tester can interact with.
• Configuration – Configurations are used for creating images. We use this term to
denote a particular setup for an application and its supporting software components
with particular values of setup parameters (configuration files, packages, etc.), as
well as a set of instructions that are automatically executed in order to create an
image in which these applications and components are “deployed”.
• Container – an instance of an image. This instance represents a certain state of
an application and its software environment, that can be “run” for testing, and
dismissed when testing is over. It can be either started using the pristine state of
its base image (creating a new container, i.e., instance), or resumed from a certain
existing state (re-using a container, that was already instantiated).
6Technically, these concepts are implemented using Docker (https://www.docker.io/) – we describe the implementation
in Section 4.4. However, a different implementation may be obtained using traditional virtual machines to which these
general concepts can be applied as well.
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4.3.2 Typical workflow
An automated testbed should help security researchers in answering (semi) automati-
cally a number of security questions. Given an exploit X that successfully subverts an
application A running on an environment E:
1. Will X be successful on application A running on a new environment E ′?
2. Will X be successful on a new version of the application, A′, running on the same
environment?
3. Will X also be successful on a new version of the application, A′, running on a new
environment E ′?
These questions can be exemplified in the following situation:
Example 1 We have a working SQL injection exploit for the WordPress 3.2 application
running with MySQL and, we would like to know whether (1) the same exploit works for
WordPress 3.2 running with PostgreSQL; (2) the same exploit works for WordPress 3.3
running with MySQL; and (3) the same exploit works for WordPress 3.3 and PostgreSQL.
We use this example throughout the chapter to illustrate the concepts and components
used in the framework.
A key feature that we have sought to implement, is that the architecture of TestREx
should be easily extensible to allow for the inclusion of new exploits, applications, and
execution environments. Figure 4.1 shows a typical workflow when an application and
the corresponding scripted exploits are deployed and run within TestREx:
1. A tester provides the necessary configuration for a specific image, including the
application and software component files, and the scripted exploits to be executed
(the latter is optional, as TestREx also supports manual testing).
2. The Execution Engine component of TestREx builds the image and instantiates
the corresponding container.
3. The Execution Engine runs corresponding exploit(s) against the application con-
tainer,
4. and monitors whether the exploit execution was successful.
5. After the exploit(s) are executed, the Execution Engine dismisses the correspond-
ing container (optionally, further exploits may reuse the same container when the
tester wishes to observe the cumulative effect of several exploits) and cleans up the
environment.
6. The exploit(s) execution report is generated.
One of the main goals of TestREx is to make the testing process as automated as
possible. Another important task is to make it possible to run applications and exploits
in a clean and isolated environment. This is why we included the option of resetting the
state of an application before running a test – this allows to run tests in parallel (see the
point 5 above).
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The workflow of TestREx is straightforward: a tester provides configuration details of an application, its deploy-
ment environment, as well as the exploit scripts; TestREx automates the remaining actions, such as building
and loading the environment, and running and monitoring the exploit.
Figure 4.1: TestREx workflow
TestREx also includes some additional utilities. For instance, the Packing Module
allows to package configurations in compressed archive files that can be easily deployed
in another system running TestREx. Also, the Utilities module includes a collection
of scripts to import applications and exploits from other sources, such as BugBox, and to
manage the containers.
Example 2 The inputs for Example 1 are instantiated as follows:
• Application: There are two applications of interest, each one is a set of .html,
.php and .js files in a Wordpress folder.
• Configuration: There are four configurations of interest, one for WP3.2 with
MySQL, one for WP3.3 with MySQL, one for WP3.2 with PostgreSQL, and one
for WP3.3 with PostgreSQL.
• Image: There are two possible images, one with Ubuntu Linux distribution, Apache
web server and MySQL database engine, and one with Ubuntu, Apache and Post-
greSQL.
• Exploit(s): There is only one exploit – a script that navigates to the vulnerable web
page, interacts with it and injects a payload, simulating the actions of an attacker.
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In our setting, exploits are unit tests: (1) every exploit is self-contained and can be
executed independently; and (2) every exploit is targeted to take advantage of a specific
vulnerability in a given application.
When using the framework in a specific application, the exploit can be written by the
tester or taken from a public source. In any case, the exploit code must be compliant
with what we expect from an exploit, e.g., it must be a subclass of the BasicExploit
class provided with TestREx, and contain metadata that specifies the target image and
describes the exploit script (more details are in Section 4.6.3).
4.4 Implementation
TestREx is implemented in Python, mainly because it allows fast and easy prototyping
and because of the availability of libraries and frameworks, such as docker-py to interface
it with Docker (see below). Below we describe in details the implementation of each
component of the framework.
4.4.1 Execution Engine
The Execution Engine is the main TestREx module that binds all its features together.
It supports three modes of operation: single, batch and manual.
The single mode allows testers to specify and run a desired exploit against a container
that corresponds to the chosen application image just once. This is useful when the tester
wants to quickly check whether the same exploit works for a few different applications,
different versions of the same application or the same application deployed in different
software environments. A “.csv” report is generated at the end of the run.
To run applications and exploits in the batch mode, TestREx loops through a folder
containing exploit files, and runs them against respective containers, generating a sum-
mary “.csv” report in the end. In this mode, the Execution Engine maps exploits to
application images by scanning the metadata in each exploit, where appropriate target
images are specified by the tester.
For manual testing, the Execution Engine instantiates a container based on the cho-
sen application image, and returns the control to the tester (e.g., by opening a web browser
and navigating to the application, or returning a shell). No report is generated in this
case.
The Execution Engine contains an additional setting for handing containers when
chosen exploits are executed: it is possible to either destroy a particular container after
the execution, in order to start with a “fresh” instance of the image for each exploit run;
or to reuse the same container when its state has to be preserved, so that further exploits
may have a cumulative effect that the tester wishes to observe.
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4.4.2 Applications
Applications are packaged as “.zip” files containing all their necessary code and other
supporting files, such as database dumps. Unpacked applications must be located un-
der the “<testbed_root>/data/targets/applications” folder to be accessible by the
Execution Engine.
Table 4.3: Applications in the corpus
The table shows the applications (real-world and artificial ones) that TestREx currently includes. The
“Containers” column specifies a generic container upon which a specific application image is created, and the
“Source” column specifies the source from which we adapted exploits for these applications.
Language Applications Containers Source
PHP
WordPress, CuteFlow, Horde, PHP Address Book,
Drupal, Proplayer, Family Connections, AjaXplorer,
Gigpress, Relevanssi, PhotoSmash, WP DS FAQ, SH
Slideshow, yolink search, CMS Tree page view, Tiny-
CMS, Store Locator Plus, phpAccounts, Schreikasten,
eXtplorer, Glossword, Pretty Link
ubuntu-apache-
mysql
BugBox
Java WebGoat
ubuntu-tomcat-
java
WebGoat
Server-side
JavaScript
CoreApp, JS-YAML, NoSQLInjection, ODataApp,
SQLInjection, ST, WordPress3.2, XSSReflected, XSS-
Stored
ubuntu-node,
ubuntu-node-mongo,
ubuntu-node-mysql
Our
examples
As an example, we provide some applications with known vulnerabilities (listed in
Table 4.3) most of which are known real-world applications, only some of them being
small artificial examples developed by us to explore security vulnerabilities typical for
server-side JavaScript applications.
4.4.3 Images and Containers
Ideally, security testers should have the possibility of using various types of computing
components and platforms, regardless of the type of underlying hardware and software
that may be available.
To provide testers with the possibility of running applications in various environments
in a flexible, scalable, and cost-effective manner, we employ software images (that are,
implementation-wise, Docker images). Every such image represents a data storage for vir-
tualized computing components or platforms, e.g., operating systems, application servers,
database management systems, and other types of supporting applications.
Instead of creating virtual machines for applications and their software environments,
we instantiate and run containers from corresponding images. These containers are based
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Table 4.4: Software components for generic images currently provided with TestREx
Web server DB engine OS
Apache MySQL Ubuntu
Node.js MySQL Ubuntu
Node.js MongoDB Ubuntu
Tomcat MySQL Ubuntu
on the OCI7 standards, which are nowadays widely accepted in industry as a form of
“lightweight virtualization” at the operating system level. They are sandboxed filesystems
that reuse the same operating system kernel, but have no access to the actual operating
system where they are deployed.
Some initial developments in this area were FreeBSD Jails8, Solaris Zones9, and Linux
Containers10. Currently, Docker is the de facto standard for containers. Docker provides
a format for packing and running applications within lightweight file repositories that are
called Docker containers. We use Docker to create images and instantiate containers.
Images are specified in Dockerfiles (a format defined by the Docker project) – these files
represent configurations to which we refer in Section 4.3.1. Downloading generic software
components and re-creating a Docker container from a corresponding image every time an
application has to be run might be resouce- and time-consuming. Therefore, we use im-
age inheritance supported for Dockerfiles, creating several images for containers that hold
generic software components, and can be reused by certain types of web applications. For
instance, such images may encapsulate an operating system, a web server and a database
engine, and their corresponding containers are instantiated only once. We provide some
predefined images for common environments, using software components shown in Ta-
ble 4.4. We use the following naming convention for such images: “<operating_system>
-<webserver>-<database>-<others>”. In contrast, for images which actually contain
an application to be tested (apart from generic software components) we use a different
naming convention: “<application-name>__[software-image-name]”.
When the Execution Engine invokes an application image, the corresponding con-
tainer will be instantiated and run using Docker. Then, depending on the run setting
(see Section 4.4.1), the container will be handled correspondingly when chosen exploits
are executed (either destroyed, or reused for further exploit runs).
Figure 4.2 gives an intuition on how an image for the WordPress 3.2 application can
be composed with Dockerfiles: the image is created on the basis of two images combining
Ubuntu OS with Apache web server and MySQL database.
7https://www.opencontainers.org/
8https://www.freebsd.org/doc/handbook/jails.html
9https://docs.oracle.com/cd/E18440_01/doc.111/e18415/chapter_zones.htm
10https://linuxcontainers.org/
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Application images are composed of several “layers”: an operating system, a web server, and a database engine –
the application itself is deployed on top. These components can be combined in all possible configurations supported
by the application.
Figure 4.2: Wordpress3.2 ubuntu-apache-mysql image
4.4.4 Configurations
Implementation-wise, configurations correspond to the contents of Dockerfiles and sup-
porting scripts that specify how an application can be installed and run in a container,
including, e.g., prerequisites such as preloading certain data to a database, creating
users, and starting a server. Additionally, configuration data for applications may in-
clude databases and application data.
The configuration files must be placed in a separate folder under the configurations
root folder (“<testbed_root>/data/targets/configurations”). We use the following
naming convention to simplify matching configuration files with images that can be created
using them: “<app-name>__<app-container-name>”.
Example 3 A configuration folder for the application “Wordpress_ 3. 2 ”, might have the
names “Wordpress_ 3. 2_ _ubuntu-apache-mysql ” or “Wordpress_ 3. 2_ _ubuntu-
apache-postgresql ”, depending on the image that is intended for it.
Listings 4.1 and 4.2 present an example of a Dockerfile and a “run.sh” file, used to
configure a WordPress 3.2 application within the “ubuntu-apache-mysql” image.
In Listing 4.1, line 1 specifies that the image for this application is built on top of the
“ubuntu-apache-mysql” image. In lines 2 and 3, the application files are copied to the
“/var/www/wordpress” folder in the image and in lines 4 and 5, the “run.sh” script is
invoked inside the container.
1 FROM ubuntu−apache−mysql
2 RUN mkdir / var /www/ wordpress
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3 ADD . / var /www/ wordpress
4 RUN chmod +x / var /www/ wordpress /run . sh
5 CMD cd / var /www/ wordpress && . / run . sh
Listing 4.1: Dockerfile example
1 #!/ bin /bash
2 mysq ld sa fe &
3 s l e e p 5
4 mysql < database . s q l
5 mysqladmin −u root password toor
6 apache2ct l s t a r t
Listing 4.2: Shell script file example
In Listing 4.2, lines 2-5 are used to start the database server and pre-load the database
with application data. Line 6 starts the Apache web server.
4.4.5 Exploits
Table 4.5 shows the classification of typical security flaws that might be present in both
client- and server-side parts of a web application11, which can be tested with TestREx.
In TestREx, exploits may be any executable file that, when executed in a specified
context, provide testers with unauthorized access to, or use of functionality or data within
that context. Exploits include any sequence of steps that must be taken in order to cause
unintended behavior through taking advantage of a vulnerability in an application and/or
surrounding environment. For example, exploits may be used to provide access to sensitive
data, such as financial data or personal data. Exploits may hijack capabilities or other
functionalities of applications and cause the applications to perform tasks that are not
desired by authorized users, such as tracking user activities and reporting on these to the
unauthorized user of the exploit. Other types of exploits may allow unauthorized users
to impersonate authorized users.
Still, the above description of an exploit is quite vague, and may lead to having many
automated exploit scripts that are not compatible due to various differences in their
implementation (e.g., as a consequence it may be difficult to run them in a batch, and/or
use them to produce a unified testing report). To avoid these potential problems, we
implemented exploits as a hierarchy of Python classes that have the following minimal
set of properties: (1) every exploit contains metadata describing its characteristics such
as name, description, type, target application and container; (2) exploit classes must pass
logging information and results of the run to the Execution Engine, providing a way for
the Execution Engine to know that the exploit execution was successful.
11This classification is according to the OWASP TOP 10: https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Top_10_2013-Top_10
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Table 4.5: Security flaws of web applications
The following security flaws may be present in web applications regardless of their implementation and
deployment details. Yet, their successful exploitation strongly depends on the actual variant of deployment (e.g.,
MongoDB versus MySQL database, type and version of the web server, etc.).
Security flaw Description Tech.
impact
SQL/NoSQL
injection
(SQLi/NoSQLi)
User input is used to construct a database query and is not properly sanitized,
allowing a malicious user to change the intended database query into an arbi-
trary one. Threats: Information Disclosure, Data Integrity, Elevation
of Privileges.
Severe
Code injection Similar to SQLi/NoSQLi, however, instead of a database, user input is exe-
cuted by a code/command interpreter. Malicious payload can be executed on
both client and server, and may result into a complete takeover of the host
machine on which the vulnerable application runs. Threats: Information
Disclosure, Data Integrity, Elevation of Privileges, Host Takeover.
Severe
Cross-site scripting
(XSS)
Each time a user-supplied data is being displayed in a web browser, there is
a risk of XSS attacks: attacker can supply JavaScript code that either gets
executed in a victim’s browser and stealing victim’s credentials or making
actions on her behalf. Almost any source of data can be an attack vector (e.g.,
direct user input, data coming from a database, etc.). Threats: Information
Disclosure, Elevation of Privileges.
Moderate
Cross-site
request forgery
(CSRF)
CSRF attacks take advantage of benign applications that allow attackers to
act on their behalf: user is secretly redirected from a trusted page to attacker’s
page, and user’s authentication information is used by an attacker. Applica-
tions that allow manipulations with DOM container of its pages are vulnerable.
Threats: Session/Credentials Hijacking.
Moderate
Unvalidated
URL redirects
URL redirects instruct the web browser to navigate to a certain page. While
this feature can be useful in many different contexts, developers should be
careful and restrict user manipulations with a destination page: an attacker
may conduct phishing attacks using a trustworthy website that has this vul-
nerability. Threats: Open Redirect.
Moderate
Sensitive data
disclosure
Sensitive/Personal data is attractive for attackers per definition, therefore the
goal of most of attacks is to get a piece of such data. Since personal data is
usually protected by law regulations, every such data flow in a web applica-
tion must be protected against injection and interception attacks, as well as
overly detailed error messages and application logic flaws that disclose context
information to potential attackers. Threats: Information Disclosure.
Severe
Test code leftovers A tester may insert a piece of testing code into the application and forget to
remove it upon release. This can lead to any kind of unexpected behavior:
for example, anyone could get access to the application with a login ’Bob’
and a password ‘123’ gaining full administrator access. Such forgotten pieces
of test code are indistinguishable from maliciously crafted backdoors per se.
Threats: Backdoor.
Severe
Using known
vulnerable
components
If vulnerable versions of third-party components are used (e.g., an open source
library) in a web application, an attacker can identify known vulnerabilities
and perform a successful attack. In many cases, developers are not aware of
all components they are using for their application. Vulnerable component de-
pendencies aggravate the problem. Threats: Potentially all of the above.
May
vary
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We also incorporate the Selenium Web Driver 12 for implementing exploits, as it can
be used to simulate user/attacker actions in a web browser, and provides all necessary
means to automate them. Additionally, it supports JavaScript execution and DOM in-
teraction [114]. Every Selenium-based exploit in the framework is a subclass of the
BasicExploit class, which encapsulates basic Selenium functionality to automate the
web browser (e.g., “setUp()” and “tearDown()” routines, logging and reporting, etc.).
To create a new exploit, the tester has to create a new exploit class, specify the exploit-
specific metadata and override the “runExploit()” method by adding a set of actions
required to perform an exploit. The success of an exploit run is also verified within the
“runExploit()” method - this might be different for every exploit – this allows us to
handle complex exploits that are not always deterministic. For such cases, the exploit can
be specified to run a certain number of times until it is considered a success or a failure.
The current implementation of TestREx exploits allows testers to interact with a
vulnerable web application via a web browser, and is targeted at attacking (and changing
the state of) that web application only. However, it is possible to develop other classes
of exploits for exploring more complex scenarios that allow to go beyond testing for the
presence of a vulnerability using a web browser. For instance, a vulnerability in a web
application may be used as an entry point for installing a backdoor to the machine where
this application is deployed (e.g., chaining the path traversal vulnerability in Apache
Tomcat CVE-2008-2938 to obtain a local web server’s account, and obtain the root shell
using another vulnerability of Apache Tomcat – CVE-2016-1240 ).
4.4.6 Report
Different context conditions may transform failed exploit attempts into successful ones,
and vice versa. A given exploit test may include a number of possible combinations
of applications, execution environments, and exploits, each of which may be configured
in various ways. For example, an exploit that may be successful in exploiting a first
application in a first environment may not be successful in exploiting the same application
in a second environment, but may be successful in exploiting a second application in the
second environment. Moreover, upon determining a success of a given exploit, it will be
necessary to make some change to the application and/or execution environment, which
will necessitate yet another testing (re-testing) of the previously successful exploit to
ensure that the change will prevent future successful exploits.
Therefore, we include reporting functionality: whenever TestREx runs an exploit, it
generates a report that contains the information about its execution. A report is a “.csv”
file that the Execution Engine creates or updates every time it runs an exploit. Every
report contains one line per exploit that was executed. This line consists of the exploit
12http://docs.seleniumhq.org/projects/webdriver/
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and the target application names, identifier of an application-specific container, the type
of the exploit, the exploit start-up status, the exploit execution result, and a comment
field that may include other information that might be exploit-specific. Along with this
report, the Execution Engine maintains a log file that contains information which can
be used to debug exploits.
Example 4 The listing below shows a single entry from the Wordpress 3 2 XSS exploit
that was run against the WordPress 3.2 application.
1 Wordpress 3 2 XSS , Wordpress3 . 2 , ubuntu−apache
2 −mysql , XSS , CLEAN, SUCCESS, SUCCESS, 30 .345 ,
3 Exp lo i t s f o r ”XSS v u l n e r a b i l i t y in WordPress app”
Listing 4.3: An example of the report file entry after the exploit run
4.5 Evaluation
As a starting point in evaluation our framework, we successfully integrated 10 examples
from WebGoat [119], as well as the corresponding vulnerable web application. We have
also developed exploits for 7 specially crafted vulnerable applications, in order to demon-
strate different types of exploits for SQL injection, NoSQL injection, stored and reflected
XSS, path traversal and code injection vulnerabilities in server-side JavaScript applica-
tions. The path traversal and the code injection examples take advantage of vulnerabilities
discovered in Node.js modules [115,116].
Table 4.6: Number of exploits in the corpus
The table lists the number of exploits in the current corpus of TestREx, broken down by a vulnerability type
and a programming language of the vulnerable portion of the source code that makes the exploitation possible.
Exploit #PHP #Java #Server JS
Cross-site scripting 46 2 3
SQL injection 17 2 1
Code injection 7 - 1
Authentication flaw 4 3 -
Information disclosure 2 - -
Local file inclusion 2 - -
Cross-site request forgery 2 - -
Denial of service 1 - -
Database backdoor - 1 -
Parameter tampering - 2 -
Path traversal - - 1
The framework also supports the possibility of importing applications and exploits from
BugBox, and similar testbeds. An automated script copies the applications and exploits
45
CHAPTER 4. TESTREX: A TESTBED FOR REPEATABLE EXPLOITS
into the corresponding folders under the framework, and creates identical configuration
files for every application, using Apache as a web server and MySQL as a database server.
We are able to run most of the BugBox native exploits and collect statistics without
modifying their source code.
Table 4.6 summarizes the types of exploits that we tested in various applications using
TestREx: we can see that TestREx supports a variety of typical web application
security flaws.
4.6 Contributing to TestREx
Here we describe in more detail the steps needed to add an experiment to TestREx,
given an existing application. These steps consist of: adding an application; creating
configuration files for images; instantiating containers; creating and running exploits.
Again, we use WordPress 3.2 as the example application.
4.6.1 Deploying an Application
We again use Wordpress 3.2 as an example. The code of the application must be copied
into a separate folder under the applications root “<testbed_root>/data/targets/
applications”. The folder name must correspond to a chosen name of the application
in the testbed.
To deploy the WordPress 3.2 application, copy all of its files to the folder “<testbed_
root>/data/targets/applications/WordPress_3_2”.
4.6.2 Creating Configuration Files and Building Containers
If there are no generic images that might be reused for creating a new image for the
application set up, this image must be created in the first place. Configuration files
for generic images are located under the “<testbed_root>/data/targets/containers”
folder.
In our example, we create a generic image with the ubuntu-apache-mysql name,
since the application requires Apache as a web server and MySQL as a database engine.
To do this, we create a Dockerfile under “<testbed_root>/data/targets/containers/
ubuntu-apache-mysql” that contains the code shown in Listing 4.4, and build it with
the script located under “<testbed_root>/util/build-images.py”.
1 FROM ubuntu : r a r i n g
2 RUN apt−get update
3 RUN DEBIAN FRONTEND=n o n i n t e r a c t i v e apt−get −y i n s t a l l mysql−c l i e n t mysql−s e r v e r
apache2 l ibapache2−mod−php5 php5−mysql php5−ldap
4 RUN chown −R www−data :www−data / var /www/
5 EXPOSE 80 3306
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6 CMD [ ”mysqld” ]
Listing 4.4: The Dockerfile for creating the ubuntu-apache-mysql generic image
As a next step, we create configuration files for the image that will hold the ap-
plication, extending the above generic image. We create a new Dockerfile and a shell
script file under the “<testbed_root>/data/targets/configurations/Wordpress_3_
2__ubuntu-apache-mysql” folder (see Listings 4.1 and 4.2 in the Section 4.4.4 for the
code examples).
There is no need to manually invoke Docker for instantiating a container based on this
image for running exploits or manual testing, as Execution Engine does it automatically.
4.6.3 Creating and Running an Exploit
Finally, we create an exploit for the Wordpress 3.2 application by creating a Python
class under the “<testbed_root>/data/exploits” folder. As mentioned in the previous
sections, to ensure integration with the Execution Engine, the new exploit class must
be a subclass of the already existing BasicExploit class. As a last step, we specify the
exploit’s metadata using the attributes dictionary, and specify the steps required to run
the exploit within the “runExploit()” method (see Listing 4.5).
1 from Bas i cExp lo i t import Bas i cExp lo i t
2 c l a s s Exp lo i t ( Bas i cExp lo i t ) :
3 a t t r i b u t e s = {
4 ’Name ’ : ’ Wordpress 3 2 XSS ’ ,
5 ’ De s c r ip t i on ’ : ”XSS attack in Wordpress 3 . 2 ” ,
6 ’ Target ’ : ”Wordpress3 . 2 ” ,
7 ’ Container ’ : ’ ubuntu−apache−mysql ’ ,
8 ’Type ’ : ’XSS ’
9 }
10
11 de f runExplo i t ( s e l f ) :
12 w = s e l f . wrapper
13 w. nav igate ( ” http :// l o c a l h o s t :49160/ wordpress /wp−admin/ post−new . php? pos t type
=page” )
14 ‘ ‘ ‘
15 ‘ ‘ ‘
16 c o n t e n t e l t = w. f i n d ( ” content ” ) . c l e a r ( )
17 c o n t e n t e l t . keys ( ”<s c r i p t>a l e r t (\”XSS ! ! \ ” )</s c r i p t>” )
18 w. f i n d ( ” pub l i sh ” ) . c l i c k ( )
19
20 w. nav igate ( ” http :// l o c a l h o s t :49160/ wordpress /? page id=23” )
21 a l e r t t e x t = w. c a t c h a l e r t ( )
22 s e l f . a s s e r t I n ( ”XSS” , a l e r t t e x t , ”XSS” )
Listing 4.5: Wordpress 3 2 Exploit.py file contents
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Listing 4.5 shows the stored XSS exploit for the Wodpress 3.2 application. The script
navigates to the login page of the Wordpress application, logs in as the administrator (the
full list of steps is shortened in the listing for the sake of brevity), and creates a new post
putting the <script>alert(‘XSS‘)</script> string as the content. To verify whether
the exploitation was successful, the script navigates to the newly created post and checks
if an alert box with the “XSS” message is present.
1 #1 : Manual mode
2 sudo python run . py −−manual −−image
3 [ app−name ] [ image−name ]
4
5 #2 : S i n g l e e x p l o i t mode
6 sudo python run . py −−e x p l o i t [ exp l o i t−name ] . py
7 −−image [ app−name ] [ image−name ]
8
9 #3 : Batch mode f o r a s i n g l e a p p l i c a t i o n
10 sudo python run . py −−batch
11 −−image [ app−name ] [ image−name ]
12
13 #4 : Batch mode f o r a l l a p p l i c a t i o n s
14 sudo python run . py −−batch
Listing 4.6: Running modes in TestREx
Listing 4.6 shows the list of commands for different running modes in TestREx:
1. To run the application container for manual testing, a tester has to use the “–
manual” flag and the corresponding application image. TestREx will run the con-
tainer and halt, waiting for the interrupt signal from the tester. In this mode, when
the container is up, the application can be accessed from a web browser by navigating
to “http://localhost:49160”.
2. In the single mode a tester can select a specific exploit and run it against a specific
application image.
3. In the batch mode for a single application, a tester has to specify the running mode as
“–batch”, and select the desired application image. TestREx will invoke a Docker
container for the image, search for the exploits that are assigned to the application
(through exploits’ metadata), and run all of them one by one.
4. Finally, if a tester specifies nothing but the “–batch” running mode, TestREx will
invoke containers for all application images that are currently in the corpus, and run
all corresponding exploits against them.
By default, the exploit execution report is saved into the “<testbed_root>/reports/
ExploitResults.csv” file. In order to specify a different location for the results, the
tester may add an additional parameter to the run command:
--results new/location/path.csv.
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4.7 Potential Industrial Application
There are several uses of TestREx that we are exploring in an industrial setting, covering
different phases of the software development lifecycle and fulfilling the needs of different
stakeholders. In the following we summarize the directions that we deem more promising.
4.7.1 Support for Internal Security Testing and Validation
Automated validation and regression testing. As a part of the software development
lifecycle, TestREx can be used to check for the absence of known vulnerabilities or to
perform regression tests (for instance, as a part of automated Continuous Integration
processes) to verify that a previously fixed vulnerability is not introduced again. In
large corporations, the results of these tests are part of the evidence needed in order
to pass quality assurance gates. Currently, the process of producing such evidence is
mostly relying on manual work, which increases the costs, potential errors, and decreases
the predictability of the final result. To this end, TestREx can be used to accelerate
and improve the effectiveness and the predictability of quality assurance processes: a
company can maintain a corpus of exploits and configurations stored in a corporate-wide
repository (updating configurations and exploits on a periodic basis if necessary), and use
it to perform automated tests all along the development cycle.
Support for penetration testing. An important problem arising in penetration
testing of large systems is the complexity of setting-up and reproducing the conditions
of the target system – typically involving many hosts and software components, each of
which may need to be configured in a specific way. A key strength of our framework is the
ability to capture these configurations as reusable scripts; this requires a non-negligible
effort, but the results can be reused across different pen-testing sessions. This has the
advantage of providing automation, reproducibility, and the ability to proceed stepwise
in the exploration of the effect of different configurations and versions of the software
elements on the presence (or absence) of vulnerabilities in the system.
4.7.2 Support for Testing of Third-parties Applications
Security testing of cloud-based applications. One valuable use of TestREx is for
cloud-based applications. In this scenario, a Cloud Service Provider (CSP) provides the
platform on which an Application Provider (AP) may run their applications. CSPs allow
the same application to be provided in different platforms. However, such variations in
context correspond to potential difficulties in ensuring reliable and complete security test-
ing, because successful protection against an exploit in one context may prove unsuccessful
in another context. In this setting, TestREx can provide highly adaptable, flexible, effi-
cient, and reliable testing for different configurations, without requiring highly-specialized
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knowledge or abilities on the part of the security tester. For example, the security tester
may be an employee of a CSP, which must provide evidence to the AP that the CSP
platform is secure. In turn, the security tester may be a member of the AP, who needsto
perform an independent testing of one or more platforms or platform providers.
“Executable documentation” of vulnerability findings. When a vulnerability
is found in a product, the ability to reproduce an attack is a key to the investigation of
the root cause of the issue and to providing a timely solution. The current practice is
to use a combination of natural language and scripting to describe the process and the
configuration necessary to reproduce an attack. Unfortunately, the results may be erratic
and may complicate the security response. TestREx exploit scripts and configurations
can be seen as “executable descriptions” of an attack. The production of exploits and
configurations could not just be the task of the security validation department, but also
of external security researchers, for which the company might set up a bounty program
requiring that vulnerabilities are reported in the form of TestREx scripts.
4.7.3 Analysis and Training
Malware analysis. Malicious applications, also known as malware, are applications
intentionally designed to harm their victims, by, e.g., stealing information or taking control
of the victim’s computer. Malware in general, and especially web malware, are known to
react differently to different environments (usually to avoid detection) [38,93]. Containers
provide safe and repeatable environments for malware analysts to run their experiments.
One possible use of TestREx is as a highly configurable sandboxing environment, where
malware analysts can run potentially malicious applications in different configurations of
an application to study its behavior. Another possible use is as a honeypot generator.
Honeypots [37] are intentionally vulnerable applications deployed on a network to capture
and study attacks.
Part of a training toolkit. Security awareness campaigns, especially secure coding
training, are commonly conducted in large enterprises, also in response to requirements
from certification standards. From our own experience with TestREx, we believe that
writing exploits may be an effective way to acquire hands-on knowledge of how security
vulnerabilities work in practice, and how to code defensively in order to prevent them: we
successfully used TestREx for teaching a Master course13 on security vulnerabilities in
web applications. To quickly create a large corpus of artificially vulnerable applications for
training purposes, it is possible to start from well-known applications and use vulnerability
injection, as done in [60, 122]. This way, we can easily create multiple examples for each
category of vulnerabilities, with different levels of complexity for detection or exploitation.
13A past edition of the “Offensive Technologies” course provided by University of Trento (http://securitylab.disi.
unitn.it/doku.php?id=course_on_offensive_technologies).
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4.8 Conclusions
In this chapter, we presented TestREx, a Framework for Repeatable Exploits that com-
bines a way of packing applications and execution environments, automatic execution of
scripted exploits, and automatic reporting, providing an experimental setup for security
testers and researchers. TestREx provides means for the evaluation of exploits, as the
exploits are reproduced in a number of different contexts, and facilitates understanding of
effects of the exploits in each context, as well as discovery of potential new vulnerabilities.
We also provide a corpus of applications and exploits, either adapted from the existing
works, or developed by us – we collected it to test the variety of applications and exploits
that can be handled by TestREx.
4.8.1 Lessons learned
We can summarize the key lessons learned during the design and development of TestREx
as follows: (1) build on top of existing approaches; (2) have a simple and modular archi-
tecture; (3) find reliable information on applications, exploits and execution environments
in order to replicate them.
Building on top of the existing work, like we did with BugBox [114] for the format
of our exploits, and MalwareLab [7] for the vulnerability experimentation design, was
extremely valuable. This simplified our design and development time, and allowed us
to quickly add a large corpus of applications and exploits on which we could test our
implementation.
Having a simple and easily extensible architecture was crucial in the development of
TestREx, because this allows replacing the supporting frameworks (such as Selenium
and Docker), selecting those that best fit the tester’s purposes.
When adding the experiments to TestREx corpus, we soon learned that writing
configuration files for application containers required the most effort. This is partially
because the information on how to configure an application for a certain environment
may be not detailed enough and may require additional knowledge from a tester. Also, in
many cases, publicly available exploit descriptions are vague, limited to a proof-of-concept
(which may not necessarily work), and often lack information on how to reproduce them in
a specific software environment. This makes replication of the exploits a time consuming
problem, even for experienced developers – which is one of suitable scenarios for which
TestREx is intended.
4.8.2 Future work
When stating Problem 1 we discussed that successful exploitation may depend on specific
software environments in which a vulnerable application is deployed. A possible extension
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of the approach may be in including additional tools (for instance, tools that allow to
instrument the code of an application) that would allow to test whether a certain exploit
failed because of the aspects of the software environment (e.g., the database engine is
MongoDB instead of MySQL), or the exploit failed because of some other reasons (e.g.,
there is a bug in the exploit itself, or the application is already protected against the
exploit).
It is also possible that other types of exploits, such as malware, may run successfully on
a physical machine, but not in virtual environments [126]. Our current focus is on checking
whether atomic exploits are successfully executed against particular vulnerabilities of web
applications deployed in particular software environments. Still, checking the success of
malware that implements detection evasion mechanisms may be an interesting line of
future work.
Another potential line of future work is expanding the current vulnerability corpus
by taking public exploits from, e.g., Exploit-DB and reconstructing the corresponding
vulnerable environments in TestREx. This activity will be useful for performing an
evaluation of the framework in order to identify its interesting potential extensions (for
instance, introducing new classes of exploits, or configurations).
We also plan to extend the architecture of TestREx to add support for plugins.
Plugins (e.g., proxy tools, vulnerability scanners) could be used to facilitate activities
such as penetration testing, vulnerability analysis, and malware analysis, mentioned in
Section 4.7.
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Chapter 5
A Screening Test for Disclosed
Vulnerabilities in FOSS Components
This chapter describes our solution to Problem 2 of secure FOSS consumption, which
concerns fast and efficient identification of FOSS versions that are likely affected by a
newly disclosed vulnerability. We provide a screening test: a novel, automatic method
based on thin slicing, for quickly estimating whether a given vulnerability is present in a
consumed FOSS component by looking across its entire repository in a matter of minutes.
We show that our screening test scales to large open source projects that are routinely used
by large software vendors, scanning thousands of commits and hundred thousands lines
of code. Further, we provide insights on the empirical probability that for the sample of
projects on which we ran our test a potentially vulnerable component might not actually
be vulnerable after all.
5.1 Introduction
Software vendors that ship FOSS components to their customers as parts of their software
applications must provide maintenance support for the software as a whole, including the
consumed FOSS libraries. Therefore, if a vulnerability is reported, e.g., in the NVD
(https://nvd.nist.gov/) about those FOSS libraries, the vendor is called to make a
decision: (1) the upgrade requires minimal effort as the FOSS methods, and its APIs
have not changed between the old deployed version and the new fixed version; (2) the
consuming application is not using the vulnerable part of the FOSS component; (3) the
application may already have code that protects itself against the vulnerability; (4) the
old version of the FOSS component may be not affected at all because the vulnerable
code was not yet introduced1.
1Vulnerability databases (e.g., NVD) over-approximate the classification by using a default claim “version x and all prior
versions”, so public data is not reliable for old components.
53
CHAPTER 5. A SCREENING TEST FOR DISCLOSED VULNERABILITIES IN FOSS
COMPONENTS
If a new vulnerability is disclosed and fixed in the current version of a FOSS component,
the vendor of the consuming application must assess (i) which (often more than 5 years
old) releases are vulnerable and (ii) what actions should be taken to resolve issues for
its different customers. One simple solution would be to just update the used version
of a component as soon as a fix is available. This is the model many free, no-warranty,
software clients (e.g. Google Chrome and Mozilla Firefox), but it is often not applicable to
components used in business software, control systems, etc. Economic theory [55,79,107]
dictates that if updates are costly (e.g., regression testing, re-licensing licensing fees, re-
certification of compliance, users’ training, etc.) and problematic [131], and new features
are not needed, customers will stay with old but perfectly functioning versions of the
main application – we illustrated this empirically for an ERP product with Figure 3.2
in Chapter 3: significant number of customers used applications which were between five
and nine years old. These applications included FOSS components that were “new” at
the deployment time, but are now several years old. As a result, an enterprise system may
be bundled with a FOSS release which is several years older than the currently available
FOSS version. Thus, for an enterprise software vendor, addressing the above questions
(i) and (ii) is far from trivial [90].
Unfortunately, is difficult for vendors to locate defects in a FOSS component used as
a “black box” [90, 137], and therefore these vulnerabilities have higher chances of being
left unresolved [62]. To identify the above cases, a vendor may test its application against
a working exploit, but for many vulnerabilities there are no public exploits [8]. Even
if published exploits exist, they must be adapted to trigger the FOSS vulnerability in
the context of the consuming application. An alternative is to apply static application
security testing tools (SAST) against the FOSS component. Such analysis requires a solid
understanding of the FOSS source code [90], as well as expertise in SAST tools [18], as
they can generate thousands of potentially false warnings for large projects. Further, the
analysis may require days for processing even a single ‘FOSS-release’ ‘main-application’
pair [2]. If several FOSS releases are used in many different products [48] the above
solutions do not scale.
This chapter presents our solution to the difficulties of identifying which older versions
of FOSS components that software vendors ship to their customers are likely to be affected
by newly disclosed vulnerabilities. We build on the intuition by Hindle et al. [74]:“semantic
properties of software are manifest in artificial ways that are computationally cheap to
detect automatically, in particular when compared to the cost [. . . ] of determining these
properties by sound (or complete) static analysis” in the direction of “soundiness” [92] to
provide an automatic scalable method for performing such estimates using vulnerability
fixes. Our solution provides an insight on the empirical probability that a potential
vulnerable component might not actually be vulnerable if it is too old (or its update
might be likely costly).
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Table 5.1: Maintenance Cycles of Enterprise Software
Maintenance cycles of ten years or more are common for software used in enterprises. During this period,
vendors need to fix security issues without changing either functionality or dependencies of the software.
Product Release EoLife ext. EoL
Microsoft Windows XP 2001 2009 2014
Microsoft Windows 8 2012 2018 2023
Apache Tomcat 2007 2016 n/a
Red Hat Ent. Linux 2012 2020 2023
SAP SRM 6.0 2006 2013 2016
Siemens WinCC V4.0 1997 2004 n/a
Symantec Altiris 2008 2013 2016
5.2 Research Questions
The presence of a long lifecycle is not a characteristic that is inherent only to ERP
software. Table 5.1 provides an illustrative example of the life-cycle of several products
with respect to the maintenance, from operating systems to web servers, from industrial
control software to security products. For example, Red Hat Enterprise Linux released in
2012 has an extended support for 11 years (until 2023). Siemens WinCC v4.0 (software
for industrial control systems) had a lifetime of 7 years, and Symantec Altiris (service-
oriented management software) released in 2008 has an extended lifetime of 8 years.
Security experts, developers and customers have, naturally, different priorities when
deciding whether a component should be upgraded, fixed or left alone: security experts
want to minimize the attack surface and, thus, prefer upgrades of potential vulnerable
components over staying with old versions. Developers and customers try to minimize
maintenance and operational risks of changes and, thus, prefer staying with an old version
if the security risk in doing so is low.
Either way, we need to allocate resources to either port each application release, or au-
dit their security. For example, developers could use Wala [150] or Soot [160] to construct
a program slice on the vulnerable release, focusing only on the relevant subset of the vul-
nerable component. This slice could be later used by a sound SAST tool to ascertain that
the vulnerability is indeed not present. Unfortunately, neither precise program slicing, nor
a precise SAST tool scales well to large programs: tools providing a precise analysis can
take days for one version of a component [2] or generate too many false alarms [17,135] –
this approach would not make it possible to manage the situation depicted in Figure 3.2
(Chapter 3), where we must assess several FOSS versions at once.
To focus our efforts on the actual vulnerable products, we must tentatively identify
within minutes (not hours or days) all products that are likely affected by the vulnerability.
We need the software equivalent of a clinical screening test [68]: something that may be
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neither (formally) sound, nor complete, but works well enough for practical problem
instances and is fast and inexpensive2. Therefore, our first research question is as follows:
RQ1: Given a disclosed security vulnerability in a FOSS component, what could be an
accurate and efficient screening test for its presence in previous revisions of the com-
ponent?
Once we have such a screening test, we may use it for company-wise estimates to
empirically assess the likelihood that an older version of a FOSS component may be
affected by a newly disclosed vulnerability, as well as the potential maintenance effort
required for upgrading or fixing that version:
RQ2: For how long the vulnerable coding is persistent in FOSS code bases since its in-
troduction? What are the overall security maintenance recommendations for such
components?
5.3 Related Work
5.3.1 Identifying the vulnerable coding
As our RQ1 is concerned with finding an appropriate technique for capturing a vulnera-
ble code fragment using vulnerability fixes, we build upon Fonseca and Vieira [61] as the
basis for our idea of using an intra-procedural fix dependency sphere that we introduce
in Section 5.5.4. The authors of [61] compared a large sample of fixes for injection vul-
nerabilities to various types of software faults in order to identify whether security faults
follow the same patterns as general software faults: their results show that only a small
subset of software faults are related to injection vulnerabilities, also suggesting that faults
that correspond to this vulnerability type are rather simple and do not require a complex
fix. Also, the work by Thome et al. [158] shows that sound slices for this type of vul-
nerabilities are significantly smaller than traditional program slices, and that control flow
statements should be included into slices. Therefore, we collect control-flow statements
as well, in contrast to the original approach of thin slicing [150] on which we build our
implementation for capturing vulnerable code fragments using vulnerability fixes.
Modern static analysis tools such as Wala3, and Soot4 can be used for extracting the
vulnerable coding using security fixes. These tools implement different slicing algorithms
that work over byte code, offering various features and trade-offs such as redefining the
notion of relevance of statements to the seeds [150] or improving the precision of interme-
diate program representation [66]; simplifying the notion of inter-procedural dependencies
2A sound and complete solution is formally impossible to achieve: Rice’s theorem states that no recursive program can
take a non-trivial set of programs (e.g., all past releases of a FOSS component) and produce the subset of programs satisfying
a non-trivial property [147, Proof 5.28, pp243] (e.g., containing a semantically equivalent fragment of the vulnerable code
fragment).
3http://wala.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/Main_Page
4https://sable.github.io/soot/
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for efficient slicing of concurrent programs [127]; and defining slices that capture specific
classes of security vulnerabilities [158]. Acharya and Robinson [2] evaluated the applica-
bility of static slicing to identifying the impact of software changes. Their findings suggest
that for small programs (and change-sets) static slicing can be used effectively, but it faces
serious challenges when applied routinely against large systems: they report that the build
time for the intermediate representation of one version of a project took about four days
and observed that one must investigate and resolve various accuracy trade-offs in order
to make large-scale analysis possible.
Thome et al. [158] implemented a lightweight program slicer that operates on the
bytecode of a Java program and allows to extract all sources and sinks in the program for
computing a program chop that would help software developers to perform faster audits
of potential XML, XPath, and SQL injection vulnerabilities. It runs significantly faster
than traditional slicing evaluated by Acharya and Robinson [2], however, still, it was
close to impossible for our scenario (assessing thousands of revisions within seconds) to
use precise tools based on byte code, as they require to build source code and resolve all
dependencies as well. We found that for versions of Java projects which are older than
five years from now, the latter could be very challenging. Moreover, we are interested
in particular vulnerable code fragments that correspond to confirmed vulnerability fixes,
but not in the whole set of slices that may contain all possible potentially vulnerable code
fragments. Still, the approach by Thome et al. [158] can be used as a second-level test
after our screening.
Considering the above, we have reverted to thin slicing [150] and modified the original
algorithm to include the control flow statements, and limit the scope of slicing to the
methods, where a security vulnerability was fixed.
To identify whether the library is called within the context of an application that
consumes it, the approach by Plate et al. [123] can be also used as an additional test after
our screening. However, the approach [123] cannot replace our own test as it requires to
call a fully-fledged static analyzer to extract the call graph and fail our requirement of
being inexpensive.
5.3.2 The SZZ approach: tracking the origin of the vulnerable coding
It is well known that to manually identify when exactly a certain vulnerability is intro-
duced into a software component is a long process. For example, Meneely et al. [101]
studied properties of source code repository commits that introduce vulnerabilities –
the authors manually explored 68 vulnerabilities of Apache HTTPD5, and they took
six months to finish their analysis.
5We did not include this project to our sample as it is written in C, while our current implementation supports only
Java.
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Many studies on mining software repositories aim at solving the problem of manual
analysis [86, 112, 148], allowing to automate this tedious task. The seminal work by
Sliwerski, Zimmermann, and Zeller, widely known as SZZ [148], provided an empirical
study on the introduction of bugs in software repositories, showing how to locate bug fixes
in commit logs and how to identify their root causes. Their method had inspired the work
by Nguyen et al. [112] on which we also build our approach. Unfortunately, the original
SZZ approach has several limitations [86]: for instance, SZZ identifies the origin of a line
of code with the “annotate” feature of the version control system, therefore it could fail
to identify the true origin of that line of code when the code base is massively refactored
(e.g., the line of code is moved to another position within its containing method). In
our case, such a limitation would be a problem, since the code of the projects that we
considered has been massively changed over the course of time (for example, see Figure 5.4
in Section 5.7). Therefore, we adopted the heuristics by Kim et al. [86]: we perform cross-
revision mapping of individual lines from the initial vulnerability evidence and associate
them with their containing files and methods. This allows us to track the origin of lines
of code even if they are moved, or their containing file or method is renamed, or they are
moved to another location within the code base.
5.3.3 Empirical studies on trade-offs between the security risk posed by the
presence of the vulnerable coding and the maintainability
Di Penta et al. [52] performed an empirical study analyzing the decay of vulnerabilities
in the source code as detected by static analysis tools, using three open source software
systems. The decay likelihood observed by the authors [52] showed that most of potential
vulnerabilities tend to be removed from the system before major releases (shortly after
their introduction), which implies that developers may prioritize security issues resolution
over regular code changes. One of the questions that the authors in [52] aimed to answer is
similar to the first part of our RQ2, however we use a different measure of the vulnerable
coding: the lines of code relevant to a security fix as opposed to the lines of code relevant
to a static analysis warning. Moreover, our main focus is on distinct vulnerabilities that
already have evaded static analysis scans and testing by developers, therefore they will
likely show different decay.
For assessing various “global” trade-offs between a vulnerability risk that a component
(or a set of components) imposes and its maintainability, one feasible option is to employ
various risk estimation models. Samoladas et al. [139] proposed a model that supports
automated software evaluation, and specifically targets open source products. The set of
metrics considered by the model is represented by various code quality metrics (including
security), and community quality metrics (e.g., mailing lists, the quality of documentation
and developer base). While this model takes security aspects into account, they are
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represented only by two source code metrics: “null dereferences” and “undefined values”,
which is largely insufficient to cover the vulnerability fixes in our sample (see Table 5.4).
Zhang et al. [173] proposed an approach for estimating the security risk for a software
project by considering known security vulnerabilities in its dependencies, however the
approach does not consider any evidence for the presence of a vulnerability. Dumitras
et al. [53] discussed a risk model for managing software upgrades in enterprise systems.
The model considers the number of bugs addressed by an update and the probability
of breaking changes, but cannot be applied to assess individual components. As such
approaches would not allow to answer the second part of our RQ2, we resort to the code-
base evidence for telling whether it is likely that a certain version of a component imposes
security risk.
5.4 Terminology and Definitions
In this Section we briefly introduce the terminology used in the chapter:
Fixed revision r1: the revision (commit) in which certain vulnerability was fixed.
Last vulnerable revision r0: the last revision in a source code repository that con-
tained a specific vulnerability, which was eventually fixed by r1.
Initial vulnerability evidence E[r0]: the set of lines of code that correspond to the
vulnerable source code fragment in r0, obtained using changes between r0 and r1.
Vulnerability evidence E[r−i]: the set of lines of code from the initial vulnerability
evidence, that are still present in some revision r−i that precedes r0.
Repository difference diff(r−i, r−i+1): the set of lines of code changed (deleted and
added) when changes from r−i to r−i+1 were made.
Deleted lines del(r−i, ri+1): the set of lines of code deleted when changes from r−i to
ri+1 were made, s.t. del(r−i, ri+1) ⊆ diff(r−i, ri+1).
Added lines add(r−i, ri+1): the set of lines of code added when changes from r−i to ri+1
were made, s.t. add(r−i, ri+1) ⊆ diff(r−i, ri+1).
Source code of a revision code(r−i): the set of lines of code that belong to the source
code of r−i.
Set of relevant methods methods(locs, code(r−i)): set of methods to which certain
lines of code locs ⊆ code(r−i) belong.
Set of lines of code relevant to a set of methods code(methods−i): the set of lines
of code that belong to the specified set of methods, s.t. code(methods−i) ⊆ code(r−i).
Set of defined variables def(s): the function that returns a set of variables which val-
ues are defined or re-defined in a statement s.
Set of referenced variables ref(s): the function that returns a set of variables which
values are used in s.
Statement predicate isPredicateOf(s1, s2): this function indicates whether a state-
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ment s1 is a conditional statement, and a statement s2 is statement execution of
which depends upon s1 (e.g., is a part of then or else branches of a conditional
expression in Java).
5.5 Vulnerability Screening
We start answering RQ1 by discussing several alternative techniques for performing
screening tests for the likelihood of vulnerability presence.
As the fixed version r1 of a FOSS component is usually made available when a vulner-
ability is publicly disclosed, the information about source code modifications for imple-
menting the fix transforming the last vulnerable version r0 to r1 can be used to understand
where the vulnerable part in the source code is located [111,148,176]. Then, the approx-
imate code fragment that is responsible for a vulnerability can be identified and tracked
backwards in the source code repository history to identify a version that is not yet vul-
nerable [112].
Figure 5.1 illustrates an example for the vulnerability evolution in Apache Tomcat 6
(CVE-2014-0033): developers prohibited rewriting the URL string while handling session
identifiers but a flag was not checked correctly and attackers could bypass the check and
conduct session fixation attacks. The vulnerability was fixed in revision r1(1558822) (on
16.01.2014) by modifying the incorrect check (line 5) in r0(1558788)
6, making it impossible
to set a different session identifier and rewrite the URL (lines 6 and 7). Searching for the
presence of these lines in previous versions, reveals that in r1−i(1149130) (on 21.07.2011)
neither the check nor the session fixation lines are present. At that point in time, the
URL rewriting set-up was not yet introduced by developers, and hence the code base is
not yet vulnerable (to this attack).
Indeed, the absence of the vulnerable code fragment in some version r−i that is older
than the fixed r1 is an evidence , as opposed to a proof , that this version is potentially
not vulnerable: the vulnerable lines of code might be present in a different form or even
in completely different, refactored files. If security fixes are rather local [112], these code
lines constitute a prima facie evidence that we should allocate SAST, testing, or code
auditing resources to analyze in depth the versions that correspond to the revisions where
the vulnerable coding is still present, whilst having a more relaxed attitude on those
versions preceding r−i.
Let code(r0) be a source code fragment that represents a vulnerable version of software
application r0 that also contains a vulnerability V ⊆ code(r0), which is responsible for an
unwanted behavior. What is currently known, is that r0 contains the vulnerability, and
the next revision of this program r1 is fixed. It is unknown, however, whether an older
6Changes in one file may correspond to ordered but not necessarily consecutive revisions, because Subversion uses
repository global commit IDs.
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In Apache Tomcat 6, CVE-2014-0033 is fixed at revision 1558822 (=r1) on 16/01/2014. Revision 1558788 (=r1)
is the last vulnerable revision that lacks a check on whether the URL rewriting setting is disabled. The revisions
prior and including 1149130 (=ri) from 21/07/2011 and earlier are not vulnerable to CVE-2014-0033, as the
vulnerable feature is not present in these revisions.
Figure 5.1: Not all code declared vulnerable is actually so (CVE-2014-0033).
variant of the program r−i where i ≥ 1 contains this vulnerability as well.
This problem is similar to the screening tests used by clinicians to identify a possible
presence of a disease in individuals [68]. In our case, we treat all revisions prior to r0
(which is surely vulnerable) as those that potentially have the vulnerability, while different
vulnerability evidences obtained from the fix are the metric that we use to separate the
vulnerable part of the population from the non-vulnerable one.
Algorithm 1 illustrates a generic screening method for the potential presence of the
vulnerable coding:
1. Init(r0, r1) is an abstract function that, using diff(r0, r1) operation from the source
code repository, retrieves the changes made during the fix and infers the code frag-
ment responsible for the vulnerability – the initial vulnerability evidence E[r0]. An
example of such evidence can be the source code lines that were directly modified
during a fix (such evidence is considered by the original SZZ approach by Sliwerski
et al. [148], as well as by the method proposed by Nguyen et al. [112]). However,
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these modified lines of code may be not the ones actually responsible for the vulner-
ability, therefore we consider several other alternatives which we discuss in the next
subsections.
2. for each revision r−i, where i ≥ 1, the current vulnerability evidence is represented
by the lines of code from the initial vulnerability evidence that are still present in
r−i. We use the function Track(r−i, r−i+1, E[r−i]) that keeps track of these lines of
code individually, as suggested by Kim et al. [86].
3. for each revision r−i, where i ≥ 1, there is a test Test(r−i) which is essentially a binary
classifier that tells whether r−i is likely vulnerable, based on the current vulnerability
evidence and a reliability parameter δ. This parameter can be different for actual
screening methods that use different vulnerability evidence extraction techniques.
Algorithm 1 Generic screening test using vulnerability evidence
Extract the vulnerability evidence using the last vulnerable revision r0 and the fixed revision r1:
E[r0] ← Init(r0, r1) (5.1)
For each revision r−i, where i ≥ 1, the evidence is computed as follows:
E[r−i] ← Track(r−i, r−i+1, E[r−i+1]) (5.2)
Check, whether the source code of r−i is still likely to be vulnerable:
Test(r−i) =
r−i is vuln. if
|E[r−i]|
|E[r0]| > δ
r−i is not vuln. otherwise
(5.3)
The key question, however, is how to identify the right Init(r0, r1) function for the test?
As this is the primary concern of our RQ1, we start off with describing several candidates
and explaining how each of them works.
5.5.1 Deletion Screening
A prior work by Nguyen et al. [112] (inspired by the work of Sliwerski et al. [148]) has
shown that the presence of the lines of code deleted during a security fix for a browser
component may be a good indicator on the likelihood that older software versions are still
vulnerable: if at least one line of the initial evidence is present in a certain revision, this
revision is considered to be still vulnerable.
The results in [112] suggest that the source code of the files and methods in which a
security vulnerability was fixed may be not yet vulnerable at the point where they were
first introduced into the code base of a project, so that the portion of the source code
in these files and methods that is actually responsible for a vulnerability was added later
during further development.
62
5.5. VULNERABILITY SCREENING
The approach works as follows:
1. It starts by collecting the deleted lines of code from a vulnerability fix – deletion
vulnerability evidence;
2. Then, it goes iteratively over older commits/revisions in the source code repository
and checks for the presence of these lines;
3. Finally, it stops either when none of the lines from the initial evidence are present,
or when all commits/revisions are processed. When a vulnerability is fixed by only
adding lines of code, there will be no evidence to track, and the authors in [112]
conservatively assume that in such cases the whole version prior the fix (namely,
code(r0)) is vulnerable. This screening test was appropriate for the empirical analysis
of Vulnerability Discovery Models, which are typically based on NVD and its cautious
assumption “r0 is vulnerable and so are all its previous versions” (see [112]), as this
would create a consistent approximation of the NVD.
Essentially, the overall approach can be seen as an instance of the generic screening
test that we defined in Algorithm 1. In this particular case, threshold δ = 0, and our
functions are instantiated as follows:
Initd(r0, r1) =
{
code(r0) if del(r0, r1) = ∅
del(r0, r1) otherwise
(5.4)
Track(r−i, r−i+1, E[r−i]) = E[r−i+1] ∩ code(r−i) (5.5)
Test(r−i) = |E[r−i]| > δ = 0 (5.6)
For security management this may be at the same time overly conservative and too
liberal as the presence of the deleted lines may not be necessary for the vulnerability to
exist (see [112] for a discussion on such cases).
5.5.2 Method Screening
An alternative simple heuristic is the following one: “if a method that was changed during
a security fix is still present in an older version of a software product, this version is still
vulnerable”, under the conservative assumption the methods modified during the fix are
responsible for a vulnerability. Again, this rule is likely imprecise but fast and inexpensive.
We instantiate the screening test for this heuristic as follows:
methods1 ← methods(add(r0, r1), code(r1)) (5.7)
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methods0 ← methods(del(r0, r1), code(r0)) (5.8)
Initm(r0, r1) = (code(r0) ∩ code(methods1)) ∪ code(methods0) (5.9)
For Track and Test we use the same functions as for the deletion screening. However,
tracking the presence/absence of vulnerable methods (or a change in their size) may be
still overly conservative, because for cases when a method did not contain vulnerable code
since it was first introduced, it may be still reported as vulnerable.
5.5.3 “Combined” Deletion Screening
For the original deletion screening test (see Section 5.5.1), if lines were only added during
a fix, there are no cues on where vulnerable code could be located. Therefore, we can
combine the original test with the method tracking: when a vulnerability was fixed only
adding lines of code, we assume that the whole method (or methods) where these lines
were added are responsible, otherwise, the technique works exactly as the original one (as
before, δ = 0)
Inited(r0, r1) =
{
Initm(r0, r1) if del(r0, r1) = ∅
del(r0, r1) otherwise
(5.10)
Track(r−i, r−i+1, E[r−i]) = E[r−i+1] ∩ code(r−i) (5.11)
Test(r−i) = |E[r−i]| > 0 (5.12)
5.5.4 Fix Dependency Screening
Finally, we assume that not always the entire source code of fixed methods is responsible
for the occurrence of a vulnerability. For instance, Fonseca and Vieira [61] empirically
show that most of injection vulnerabilities may be due to a missing call to a sanitizer
function, which is typically located at methods where user input is processed. Therefore,
we need to devise a better approximation of the vulnerability evidence.
Let F be the fixed lines of code obtained with diff(r0, r1). In order to fix the lines of
code F ⊆ code(r0), a developer might need to consider several other lines of code related
to F – the actual vulnerable code fragment F ′. Such expansion from F to F ′ can be
progressively scaled by a parameter k: an expansion Dk(code(r0) , F ) that, given a code
fragment code(r0) and the fixed lines of code F , returns the lines of code that F depends-
on or that are dependent-on F for k steps according to some criteria for the notion of
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dependency. By D∗(code(r0) , F ) we identify the transitive closure of these dependencies,
such that F ′ ⊆ D∗(code(r0) , F ) ⊆ code(r0) – the fix dependency sphere7 of the code
fragment F .
Therefore, we instantiate another screening test that considers the source code depen-
dencies of the fixed source code fragment as follows:
Initfd(r0, r1) = D∗(code(r1) , add(r0, r1)) ∩D∗(code(r0) , del(r0, r1)) (5.13)
Track(r−i, r−i+1, E[r−i]) = E[r−i+1] ∩ code(r−i) (5.14)
Test(r−i) =
|E[r−i]|
|E[r0]| > δ (5.15)
5.6 Implementing the Fix Dependency Sphere
We implemented the dependency expansion D∗ as a generalized intra-procedural version
of thin slicing introduced by Sridharan et al. [150], which improves over the notion of
statement relevance of the original slicing algorithm by Weiser [165] to avoid collecting
overly large slices. However, our implementation is intra-procedural and operates directly
on the source code. It is possible to use precise tools such as Wala and Soot, but we have
already noted that they would take too long and require too much expertise (see [2,18]).
They should be run after the screening test on the candidate vulnerable versions.
In our case, the lines modified during a vulnerability fix are seeds, and, similarly
to [150], a slice includes a set of producer statements for the seeds. To identify simple
dependencies between statements we look for relevance relations between variables in
them. We also include a set of explainer statements that are relevant to the seeds. These
are the following types of statements:
1. Producer statements: “[...] statement s is a producer for statement t if s is a part
of a chain of assignments that computes and copies a value to t” [150]. This is an
assignment of a value to a certain variable.
2. We distinguish the following types of explainer statements:
(a) Control flow statements: the statements that represent the expressions in
the condition branches under which a producer statement will be executed (this
concept is taken from [150] as well). A statement s is control-dependent on a
conditional expression e if e can affect whether s is executed. A statement s is
7This concept is similar to the notion of k-dependency sphere introduced by Renieris and Reiss [129] for dependencies
in fault localization.
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flow-dependent on a statement t if it reads from some variable v that is defined
or changed at t, or there exists a control flow path from t to s on which v is not
re-defined.
(b) Sink statements – represents a statement that corresponds to a method call
which has a parameter to which a value flows from a producer statement. A
statement k is a relevant sink of the statement s if k is a procedure call and k is
flow-dependent on s.
Algorithm 2 Forward Slices of Relevant Variables
Set Relf (s)← def(s) if any of the following holds
1. s ∈ Seeds ∧ def(s) 6= ∅
2. there exists a preceding t such that:
(a) ref(s) ∩Relf (t) 6= ∅, or
(b) isPredicateOf(t, s) ∧Relf (t) 6= ∅
Set Relf (s)← ref(s) if any of the following holds
1. s ∈ Seeds ∧ def(s) = ∅
2. there exists a preceding t s.t. ref(s) ∩Relf (t) 6= ∅
Otherwise Relf (s)← ∅
Algorithm 3 Backward Slices of Relevant Variables
Set Relb(s)← ref(s) if any of the following holds:
1. s ∈ Seeds
2. there exists a preceding line t s.t.
def(t) ∩Relb(s) 6= ∅
// conservative: ignore step (3) for “light” slicing
3. there exists a preceding line t s.t.
t ∈ Sinks ∧ ref(t) ∩Relb(s) 6= ∅
4. there exists a succeeding t s.t.
isPredicateOf(s, t) ∧Relb(t) 6= ∅
Otherwise set Relb(s)← ∅
Therefore, our implementation proceeds as follows:
1. We start with the set of seed statements Seeds used as the slicing criteria, where
every criterion can be represented as a tuple 〈s, V 〉 (similarly to Weiser’s slicing
criterion [165]) where s is the seed statement, and V is the set of variables of interest
in that statement.
2. Then, for every statement in the slicing criteria s, we recursively identify the set of
relevant variables that are dependent-on or influence the relevant variables in s (Relf
and Relb) using Algorithms 2 and 3.
3. The final slice will include all statements in the method, for which there is at least
one variable that is relevant to the seeds.
When a statement s is a sink of the form s(x, y, z), and we collect this statement because
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the parameter x is a variable that is relevant at some other statement t, we conservatively
consider that x becomes relevant at s. However, we also consider the parameters y and
z to become relevant at s since x may be changed inside of s, as well as its value may be
passed to y and/or z.
Since this may be too conservative, as we may end up collecting too many statements
that are not actually relevant to the seeds, we also implemented a light variant of this
slicing that ignores the effect of the parameters: if a sink statement s of the form s(x, y, z)
will be included into a slice because of the parameter x, then we assume that neither x,
nor other parameters are changed inside of s, therefore their relevance will not be prop-
agated further (we empirically compare these two variants and discuss their performance
in Section 5.8).
5.7 Data Selection
During an empirical study on the drivers for security maintenance effort that we describe
throughout Chapters 3 and 6, we had informal discussions with software developers and
maintenance experts of our industrial partner. We understood that maintenance decisions
over a potentially vulnerable FOSS component can be taken on ad-hoc, component-by-
component basis. For example, a component may be forked due to porting, changing a
subset of features, or performing custom fixes for security bugs (as well as other technical
modifications) [117,132,151].
The unlikely, but not a rare decision to down-port a security fix8 may happen due to
a combination of reasons:
1. The newer version of a FOSS component that provides the fix is largely incompatible
with the coding of the application that consumes it, thus there is significant effort
involved in migrating the application;
2. The internal changes of the library are of limited concern for the developers of the
consuming application unless the functionality have been changed – the latter change
is often being captured by a change in the APIs [23,131];
3. The community that maintains the component is not likely to provide the solution
for a specific security problem with an outdated version9.
Our selection of FOSS projects is based the case study that we describe in Chapter 3,
and on what we felt to be the most challenging and interesting projects. They are typ-
ical, popular, and large Java-based components of similar size that have been actively
maintained for more than seven years. Table 5.2 lists the sample of FOSS projects on
8An example of forking and long-term maintenance is SAP’s decision to provide its own Java Virtual Machine
for several years “because of end of support for the partner JDK 1.4.2 solutions”. See http://docplayer.net/
22056023-Sap-jvm-4-as-replacement-for-partner-jdks-1-4-2.html.
9This could happen when the old version of a FOSS component is affected by a vulnerability but it is not supported by
its developers (e.g., EOL of Tomcat 5.5), or it is not actively maintained at the moment.
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Table 5.2: The sample of FOSS projects used in this chapter
The FOSS projects from our sample have been actively developed over several years (e.g., the commit speed is
between 742 and 2551 commits per year). For each component, the table lists the number of CVEs that affect
Java sources that we analyzed, and the total number of CVEs. While Apache Tomcat is older than 10 years, its
current trunk in the source code repository starts with version 6.0.0.
Project
Total
commits
Age
(years)
Avg.
commits
(per year)
Total
contributors
Current
size
(KLoC)
Total
CVEs
Processed
CVEs
µ files
touched
per fix
Apache
Tomcat (v6-9)
15730 10.0 1784 30 883 65 22 1.5
Apache
ActiveMQ
9264 10.3 896 96 1151 15 3 1.5
Apache
Camel
22815 9.0 2551 398 959 7 3 1.0
Apache
Cxf
11965 8.0 1500 107 657 16 10 2.0
Spring
Framework
12558 7.6 1646 416 997 8 5 1.6
Jenkins 23531 7.4 2493 1665 505 56 9 1.9
Apache
Derby
7940 10.7 742 36 689 4 3 2.7
which we ran our screening tests, including the total numbers of CVEs for each project
that exist in the NVD, as well as the number of CVEs that we analyzed (for which we
could identify the corresponding fix commits in their source code repositories). Figure 5.2
shows the distribution of vulnerability types from our analyzed sample of 55 CVEs.
We identify vulnerability types of every CVE from our sample according to their descriptions in the NVD. This
distribution suggests that the most prevalent type of vulnerabilities of the sample is Injection (including XSS,
CSRF, command/code execution), however it does not significantly outnumber other types (except Path traversal).
Figure 5.2: The distribution of vulnerability types
From our communications with developers we also understood that a simple metric for
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change, the number of changed API, is of greater interest for developers, as their focus is
to use the FOSS component as a (black box) library.
To collect the data, we examine the textual description of vulnerabilities from public vulnerability databases (e.g.,
the NVD) and search for references to the actual commits fixing the vulnerability. This information can be present
in the NVD, commit logs of the projects, or security notes.
Figure 5.3: Software infrastructure for obtaining the aggregated evidence
Figure 5.3 describes the software infrastructure we set up for collecting the data. We
first take the textual description of vulnerabilities from public vulnerability databases
such as the NVD, and search for the references to the actual commits that fixed the
vulnerability: this information can be either present in the vulnerability description, or in
the “references” section, or mentioned in the security notes related to the vulnerability.
Alternatively, it can be also present in the commit logs of the project’s source code
repository. While this activity can be automated, as it was done by Nguyen et al. [112],
we chose to perform it manually. It was shown by Bird et al. [28] that automatic collection
of such information may be biased, moreover, apart from looking at the NVD and commit
logs (this process can be easily automated), we had to resort to looking into various
security notes, bug trackers, and other third-party sources that do not belong to the
actual projects (this process is difficult to automate).
After the vulnerability fix commit information is consolidated, we invoke the Reposi-
tory utility component that automates various operations over source code repositories: it
instantiates a particular Repository wrapper that corresponds to a certain repository type
(currently we support Git and Apache Subversion). For every vulnerability, Repository
wrapper iterates backwards over the set of commits starting from a vulnerability fix com-
mit, and invokes the Vulnerability evidence extractor component for obtaining the various
types of vulnerability evidences: at present we implemented all algorithms discussed in
Section 5.5.
To provide also the demographics on the “number of API changes” that can cause
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For every commit in which we tracked the vulnerable coding, we collected the number of public methods that were
changed with respect to the public methods in corresponding fixes. The only exception was Jenkins – for this
project we measured the number of changed methods in all commits (not only in those in which the vulnerable
coding was present), as we found out that the repository history of this project was malformed (see Section 5.8 for
an explanation). This distribution gives an intuition on the amount of such changes within each project.
Figure 5.4: API changes statistics per project
problems when updating older vulnerable versions of FOSS components (shown on Figure
5.4), we include the Changes extractor component:
1. For each commit in which we track vulnerable coding, we identify all Java files; for
each Java file, we count and sum the number of public methods;
2. Then, we take the difference between each such commit and the commit of the
corresponding fix and count the number of public methods that are not present in
the fix, or could have been changed (looking at method signatures);
3. We record the number of changed methods in the current commit with respect to
the fix using the above two numbers.
After the vulnerability data is processed and all evidences are extracted, they are
aggregated and stored in a CSV file or a MongoDB database which can be used for
further analysis.
Figure 5.5 shows the distributions of the number of files10 and methods that were
modified for fixing CVEs from our sample, as well as the code churn11. In most cases
(51 out of 55), at most 5 files were modified, while in 29 cases only 1 file was modified.
Additionally, in 40 cases the code churn was at most 50 lines of code. This gives us an
10Here we count only Java files, excluding unit tests.
11It is difficult to automatically calculate modified lines using the diff tool, therefore we calculate code churn as the sum
of deleted and added lines as a superset that contains changed lines as well.
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The majority of security fixes from our sample were rather “local”, not spanning across many files, methods, and
lines of code.
Figure 5.5: The distribution of files and methods changed during a security fix
intuition that the majority of fixes were rather “local” and not spanning across multiple
files, methods, and commits (which would possibly require a more complex evidence
extraction mechanism).
For 49 out of 55 CVEs a fix was performed with a single commit. For every of the
other 6 CVEs that were fixed with several commits, we used an ad-hoc procedure:
1. For each such commit, we extracted and tracked the initial vulnerability evidence
independently (with (5.1) and (5.2) from Algorithm 1);
2. We aggregated the vulnerability evidences chronologically (with revision numbers)
by CVE identifiers, in particular making sure that if the evidence overlaps (e.g., the
71
CHAPTER 5. A SCREENING TEST FOR DISCLOSED VULNERABILITIES IN FOSS
COMPONENTS
same method was changed with different commits), we do not include the same lines
of code as the evidence again;
3. For such aggregated evidence, we applied the test (5.3) from Algorithm 1.
A possible phenomenon that we feared was that our implementation of fix dependency sphere (see Section 5.6)
could have saturated the analysis by including the whole method where the vulnerable code was present. This is
not happening in our sample of projects, as the vulnerable code is not totally mingled with other functionalities
present in the method.
Figure 5.6: Comparing the initial amount of lines of code obtained with conservative fix dependency
screening versus the initial size of the entire fixed method
5.8 Validation
In this Section we describe validation process that we performed to answer the part of
RQ1 about the accuracy and performance of the proposed vulnerability screening test,
and to assess the overall usefulness of the approach for the problems outlined in Section
5.2. The empirical evaluation of the lightweight slicer for finding security features inherent
for injection vulnerabilities by Thome et al. [158] reports the running time between 50
seconds to 2 minutes on a project that has 28 KLoC on average. Table 5.3 reports the
runtime of our approach over the entire repository: while we cannot directly compare the
running time of our implementation of extracting the fix dependency sphere and the slicer
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Table 5.3: Runtime performance of fix dependency evidence
The vulnerability screening test can provide an approximate evidence (based on actual code) about the presence
of the newly discovered vulnerabilities by scanning the entire lifetime of a FOSS project in matter of minutes.
Precise (but costly) static analyses can be deployed after that step, in surgical fashion.
Project Analysed Data Time (in sec)
#Commits #MLoCs mean (std)
Apache Tomcat 141016 186.331 35 ( 19 )
Apache ActiveMQ 11598 27.904 28 ( 21 )
Apache Camel 8892 4.706 16 ( 7 )
Apace Cxf 53822 28.525 49 ( 33 )
Spring Framework 17520 3.854 44 ( 35 )
Jenkins 8039 9.416 16 ( 10 )
Apache Derby 7588 5.597 17 ( 11 )
by Thome et al. [158]12, the running time of our entire approach is comparable, which
shows that it is practical.
Next, we review the vulnerabilities in our data set, and analyze their fixes to understand
whether the fix dependency sphere would capture them. The results of this analysis for the
conservative fix dependency screening are summarized in Table 5.4: it lists descriptions
of vulnerability types (taken from OWASP Top 1013), as well as descriptions of typical
fixes for these vulnerabilities. The “completeness” column describes the dependencies of
a fix that will be captured by the fix dependency sphere D∗(code(r0) , F ). We claim that
for these vulnerability types and fixes D∗(code(r0) , F ) includes the fragment of the code
responsible for the vulnerability. Therefore, tracking the evolution of D∗(code(r0) , F )
from r0 and downwards may be a satisfying indicator for the presence of a vulnerability.
12As we only extract the relevant code within a set of methods (it takes less than a millisecond), while the slicer by
Thome et al. [158] extracts all potentially relevant sources and sinks.
13https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Category:OWASP_Top_Ten_Project
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Initially, we selected 25 vulnerabilities for a manual validation, however, after initial
inspection we decided to exclude four vulnerabilities of the Jenkins project, as we observed
that the whole repository layout was deleted and copied over several times – this would
make our current automatic analysis incomplete (it stops when there is no more evidence,
and currently we did not implement heuristics that would allow to identify such corner
cases), and significantly complicate the manual analysis.
For each of the selected vulnerabilities, we identified the set of ground truth values as
follows:
1. We performed source code audits starting from the last vulnerable revision r0, moving
backwards through the repository history.
2. When we observed that any of the files initially modified to fix a vulnerability had
some changes in an earlier revision, we manually checked whether the vulnerability
in that revision was still present.
3. We stopped the analysis either on a revision that we find to be not yet vulnerable
(this implies that all earlier revisions are not vulnerable as well – we did several spot
checks going further past the first non-vulnerable revision an that was indeed the
case), or until we reached the initial revision of the repository.
The final sample for the manual assessment consisted of 126 data points across the
total of 126193 revisions, which corresponds to histories of 21 CVEs: we went backwards
iteratively, and for many revisions the vulnerability evidence did not change. Therefore,
we had to check only those points where it did actually change. The manual assessment
was carried out by three experts, who were cross-checking and discussing the results
among them before arriving at the final conclusion.
In this way, we manually annotated every revision from r0 and backwards with ground
truth values, obtaining the ground truth binary classifier:
Testgt(ri) =
{
1 if ri is still vulnerable
0 otherwise
Then, we ran every variant of the vulnerability screening test described in Section 5.5,
and compared the results with the ground truth. For every revision ri < r0 (where i < 0),
this comparison had the following result:
1. True positive: a revision was correctly classified as vulnerable (e.g., a test marks the
revision as vulnerable, and we identified that it is indeed vulnerable with our ground
truth analysis);
2. False positive: a revision was incorrectly classified as vulnerable (type I error of a
classifier);
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3. True negative: a revision was correctly classified as non-vulnerable;
4. False negative: a revision was incorrectly classified as non-vulnerable (type II error
of a classifier).
As a part of the answer to RQ1, we wanted to understand whether our fix dependency
variants of the vulnerability screening test (see Section 5.5.4) show results that are signifi-
cantly different in comparison to the existing work of Nguyen et al. [112] and the simplest
possible heuristic that can be expressed as “if the vulnerable piece of code (methods that
were fixed) does not exist yet, the vulnerability does not exist as well”.
Figure 5.7 shows the performance of the variants of the vulnerability screening test in
terms of true positive (Sensitivity) and false positive (1-Specificity) rates, when compared
to the ground truth classifier. We discuss the results below.
The “method screening” test did not show very high performance with most values
of the threshold δ. However, when δ is set to 0, the classifier is marking a revision
vulnerable based on just the presence or the absence of these methods, which may be a
good vulnerability indicator when security is the only factor that matters, as its Sensitivity
is equal to 1. Still, this strategy may have too many false positives in case affected methods
were not vulnerable right from the point when they were introduced (Specificity = 0.002).
This may result in potentially high security maintenance effort.
The “combined deletion screening” test showed similar performance to the above vari-
ant of the test, however it has slightly smaller Sensitivity (which does not contradict
with the false negative error rate reported by Nguyen et al. [112]), as in several cases the
deleted lines disappear before the actual vulnerable part of a method is gone.
The “light fix dependency screening” test shows significantly better performance when
the threshold δ is set to 0.5 and 0.2. With δ = 0.5, Sensitivity = 0.863, with Specificity =
1.0 (no false positives); while with δ = 0.2, Sensitivity equals to 1.0. However, in the latter
there are much more false positives (Specificity = 0.218). The amount of false positive
results may be not important for a security assurance team, as long as Sensitivity is close
to 1.0 [18]. On the other hand, for making quick estimates, significantly cutting down
the number of false positives may be more preferable. Thus, the above threshold values
may represent the trade-offs between the two conflicting goals: (1) the limited amount
of development resources that dictates to prioritize only the work that is necessary, and
(2) the requirement to provide maximum security assurance regardless the cost. In the
first case, most of vulnerable revisions will be recognized correctly so that the appropriate
action can be taken immediately, but there is still a small chance that some significantly
older vulnerable revisions will be marked as safe. In the second case, no revisions will be
incorrectly classified as non-vulnerable, but developers may spend a lot of additional work
on false positives – this case is still better than looking at the presence of a vulnerable
method, as it provides the same level of assurance with significantly smaller number of
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false positives.
On the other hand, the “conservative fix dependency screening” test yields more false
positives after δ > 0.5, however, for δ > 0.2 it is the same as the light test. This is
because for some of the vulnerabilities from our manual sample, the conservative test
yields a larger initial vulnerability evidence fragment capturing more lines of code within
a method that are not relevant to the vulnerable code fragment. Therefore, in such cases
initial vulnerability evidence decays slower than the initial vulnerability evidence for the
light test, showing different results at certain thresholds.
Table 5.5: Performance of the screening tests
The Precision for each test reflects the likelihood that a vulnerable revision will be correctly identified as such
by the test, while the Negative Precision suggests the opposite – the likelihood of a non-vulnerable revision to be
correctly identified as non-vulnerable. The results show that either variant of the fix dependency screening has
better discriminative capabilities than the variants of the test based on the presence of deleted lines, or the size
the affected methods.
Screening test Threshold Sensitivity Specificity Precision Neg. Precision
Method δ > 0.0 1.000 0.002 0.927 1.000
screening δ > 0.2 0.905 0.002 0.920 0.002
(Section 5.5.2) δ > 0.5 0.801 0.224 0.929 0.082
δ > 0.8 0.653 1.000 1.000 0.186
“Combined”
deletion screening
(Section 5.5.3)
δ > 0.0 0.982 0.002 0.925 0.010
Light fix δ > 0.2 1.000 0.218 0.941 1.000
dependency
screening
δ > 0.5 0.863 1.000 1.000 0.367
(Section 5.5.4) δ > 0.8 0.457 1.000 1.000 0.128
Conservative fix δ > 0.2 1.000 0.218 0.941 1.000
dependency
screening
δ > 0.5 0.742 1.000 1.000 0.235
(Section 5.5.4) δ > 0.8 0.458 1.000 1.000 0.128
However, Sensitivity and Specificity are the general characteristics of a test where the
population does not affect the result. To account for the prevalence [68] of the vulnerable
revisions we also calculate Precision and Negative Precision of the tests, which account for
the test predictive capabilities. These values are shown in Table 5.5 alongside Specificity
and Sensitivity. The values of these metrics show that the “fix dependency” variants of
the screening test have better discriminative capabilities than other variants of the test
we tried.
As can be seen from Table 5.5, the light fix dependency test (δ > 0.5) had no false pos-
itives, but had false negatives; in contrast, the conservative fix dependency test (δ > 0.2)
had no false negatives, but had false positives. Therefore, we approximate the potential
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The “combined” deletion screening test could almost always identify a vulnerable revision (Sensitivity =
0.982), but almost always failed to distinguish a revision that is not yet vulnerable. The method screening
test with δ = 0 (a revision is classified as vulnerable when affected methods are present) could always identify a
vulnerable revision (Sensitivity = 1.0), but had the same problem as the deletion screening (Specificity = 0.002).
At the same time, both light and conservative fix dependency screening tests show significantly better performance
than just looking at the deleted lines or the method(s) size: both in terms of true positive and false positive rates.
Figure 5.7: ROC curves for different variants of the vulnerability screening test
error rates for both tests – we use the Agresti–Coull confidence interval [4], that requires
to solve for p the following formula:
|pˆ− p| = z ·
√
p · (1− p)/n, (5.16)
where p – is the estimated proportion of vulnerable (non-vulnerable) revisions; pˆ – is
the sample size proportion of vulnerable (non-vulnerable) revisions over the total sample
of revisions n; and z = 1.96 – is the coefficient for the 95% confidence interval. We have
chosen a large sample of CVEs for manual verification since it corresponds to a large
sample of revisions n, which ensures small margin of error. Thus, we have a potential
error rate for the tests as follows:
• The light fix dependency test with δ > 0.5 had the 0% error rate when classifying non-
vulnerable revisions (no false positives), and 13.7%±0.2% error rate when classifying
vulnerable revisions (few false negatives);
• The conservative fix dependency test with δ > 0.2 had the 78.3% ± 0.8% error rate
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when classifying non-vulnerable revisions (significant number of false positives), and
0% error rate when classifying vulnerable revisions (no false negatives).
These results allow us to provide an answer to RQ1: tracking the presence/absence of
the vulnerable methods or lines of code deleted during a security fix may be not sufficient
from the security maintenance management perspective. Still, fairly simple heuristics that
capture the lines of code that are potentially relevant to the vulnerable part of a method
can be more suitable for this task.
5.9 Decision Support for Security Maintenance
For those FOSS components, where upgrading to the latest version would likely require a
low effort, we just might want to update them – even if the security risk is comparatively
low. For components where the upgrade (or fixing) effort is high, we still can do a more
expensive and more precise analysis. Still, getting an immediate estimate on the trade-
offs between the upgrade effort and the likelihood of the security risk is the key for not
wasting the (limited) available resources on FOSS components that are unlikely to be
vulnerable, or are likely easy to upgrade.
Therefore, to answer RQ2, and provide an insight on whether developers could extract
quick indicators for security maintenance decisions on FOSS components they consume,
we performed an empirical analysis of the persistence of potentially vulnerable coding in
source code repositories of the chosen projects. We also extracted the amount of changes
between each revision and the fix in terms of changed public API, which we use as a proxy
for the overall changes that may complicate component updates, increasing maintenance
costs (see Section 5.7).
First of all, upon disclosure of a new vulnerability, developers could use a “local”
decision support that would allow them to identify the vulnerability risk for a version of a
FOSS component in question, as well as the likelihood that the component can be updated
without any major efforts. If an easy update is not possible (and for considerably older
versions of software components this is rarely the case), the value of the vulnerability
risk indicated by the presence of the vulnerable coding may be a useful indicator for
the maintenance planning. With Figure 5.8, we illustrate such a decision support for
developers: this information is generated by running the conservative fix dependency
screening test for CVE-2014-0035 (Apache CXF). We take the absolute value of the
vulnerability evidence as the potential security risk, and measure the changes in the API
between each revision and the fix for this CVE as a proxy for the upgrade effort. If a
version of a FOSS component is not older than 2000 revisions back from the fix (approx.
1-2 years), it may be preferable to update the component, as most of the vulnerable coding
is present, and difference in the API with respect to the fix is only starting to accumulate.
81
CHAPTER 5. A SCREENING TEST FOR DISCLOSED VULNERABILITIES IN FOSS
COMPONENTS
On the other hand, if it is older than 5000 revisions back from the fix (more than 5 years),
it may be more preferable to take no action, as most of the potentially vulnerable coding
is gone, and changes accumulated between that point in time and the fix are too many.
For cases when the version of interest lies somewhere between these two areas, a custom
fix may be implemented.
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As we move backward from the fix in the revision history, the coding that is responsible for a vulnerability possibly
disappears (red curve, shows the absolute value of evidence in LoC), whereas other changes in the code base start
to accumulate (blue curve is the amount of API that changed in a certain revision with respect to the fix that
represents the effort of upgrading from that point to the fix). A very old version may require to change 13000+
public methods for a vulnerability that may be very unlikely to be there (85% chances, see Figure 5.9). Thus, the
position of the revision of interest in this diagram provides developers with a good insight on what decision to
make.
Figure 5.8: Trade-off curves for one vulnerability of Apache CXF (CVE-2014-0035)
To sketch a trade-off model that would allow to perform a retrospective analysis for
“global” security maintenance of the whole FOSS component, we attempt to generalize
the above “local” decision support. Similarly to Nappa et al. [110], who employed survival
analysis to analyze the time after a security patch is applied to a vulnerable host, we used
it to analyze the persistence of vulnerable coding that we extracted from the sample of
FOSS projects (shown in Table 5.2) with our screening tests. Survival analysis is the
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field of statistics that analyzes the expected duration of time before an event of interest
occurs [106], it is being widely used in biological and medical studies.
In our scenario, time goes backwards (from the fix), and we identify the following
event affecting every pair of (CVE, FOSS) as an individual entity, depending on one’s
considerations:
Security Risk: the event whose probability we measure is “the ratio of the vulnerability
evidence E[ri−1]/E[r0] in a screening test falls below δ”.
This event corresponds to the likelihood of the presence of the coding that is responsi-
ble for the vulnerability. To identify how this security risk may change over time, which is
the concern of our RQ2, we computed the survival probabilities of vulnerable code frag-
ments using the light fix dependency screening with δ > 0.5, conservative fix dependency
screening with δ > 0.2, method screening with δ > 0, and “combined” deletion screening
tests (the variants of the screening test which performance we show in Figure 5.7). We
performed survival analysis using the survfit14 package in R, fitting the Kaplan-Meier
non-parametric model (The Nelson-Aalen model gives the same qualitative result).
Figure 5.9 shows these survival probabilities: the vulnerable coding tends to start dis-
appearing after 1000 commits (approximately 1 year preceding the fix), as already at 2000
revisions back there are 60% chances that the vulnerable coding is still there according
to the evidence collected by conservative fix dependency screening (red curve). At 6000
revisions back (approx. 4 years) there is only 30% chance that the vulnerable coding sur-
vived, according to the same evidence. The curve that represents the probability of being
vulnerable according to the evidence obtained with light fix dependency screening (blue
curve) decays even faster. While the difference between the conservative fix dependency
screening and method/deletion evidence presence is not that obvious on this figure, it is
still significant (recall Figure 5.7).
Finally, we sketch the “global” decision support that represents the trade-offs that can
be considered for the security maintenance of a FOSS project (RQ2), we further combine
the survival curves for vulnerability evidences obtained with light and conservative fix
screening tests over the set of vulnerabilities for the Apache Tomcat project, using the
average values of API changes per project. Figure 5.10 represents the “global” trade-off
decision support for the Apache Tomcat project, that consists of the following elements:
1. The dashed red line corresponds to the conservative probability that the vulnerable
coding has survived at a certain point in time – this is based on the conservative fix
dependency screening with δ > 0.2 (our manual assessment for this test in Section
5.8 showed no false negatives, but a considerable amount of false positives).
2. The solid red line corresponds to the lightweight probability that the vulnerable
coding is still there – this is based on the light fix dependency screening with δ > 0.5
(our manual assessment for this test in Section 5.8 showed no false positives and a
14https://cran.r-project.org/web/packages/survival/survival.pdf
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The vulnerable coding tends to start disappearing after 1000 commits (<= 1 year preceding the fix), as already
at 2000 revisions back there are 60% chances that the vulnerable coding is still there according to the evidence
collected by conservative fix dependency screening (red curve). Further back (after approx. 6 years), there is only
a small probability that a component is vulnerable.
Figure 5.9: Survival probabilities of the vulnerable coding with respect to different variants of the screen-
ing test
low number of false negatives).
3. Each point on the solid blue line corresponds to the number of the API changed in a
certain revision in comparison to the fix: these are the aggregated average numbers
taken for the whole project sample (the two dashed lines are the .95% confidence
interval).
Figure 5.10 gives a recommendation to developers to update their versions of a com-
ponent on a yearly basis, as after that time the vulnerability risk is likely to be still high,
and the API changes tend to grow fast. The average amount of API changes15, as well
as both risk values, suggest that the security assessment should be performed when a
version of interest lags for around 3-4 years behind the fix (between 4000 and 6000 com-
mits). Here the down-port decision could be evaluated, considering that the conservative
risk estimate is still high at this point. Alternatively, if the lightweight risk estimate
15A certain older revision ry may actually have less API changes with respect to the fix than a certain newer rx for a
simple reason, that ry has less functionality than rx – this may be the reason why the amount of API changes that we
observe in Figure 5.10 is not as “linear” as in Figure 5.8.
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is tolerable, developers may already prefer to take no action at this point. Looking at
both conservative and lightweight probabilities for the vulnerability risk and the average
amount of the API changes, the point after 8000 commits could be the one at which the
“do not touch” decision might be the only reasonable choice.
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As we move back from the fix in the revision history, the probability that a revision is still vulnerable (red solid
and dashed curves) holds high within the first 2 years before the fix (around 4000 revisions back). At the same
time, the average amount of API changes (blue curve, the two dashed blue curves are the .95% confidence interval)
accumulates fast – this may be the right time for an update. Further back, between approx. 3 and 4 years before
the fix, the amount of changes does not grow significantly, but the vulnerability risk is still relatively high – this
may be the time frame for a thorough security assessment of a version in question. Further back (after approx. 4
years before the fix), the vulnerability risk falls down, and changes begin to accumulate even more – here the “do
not touch” decision might be the only reasonable choice.
Figure 5.10: “Global” trade-off curves for 22 vulnerabilities of Apache Tomcat
5.10 Threats to Validity
In our approach the construct validity may potentially be affected by the means of data
collection and preparation, the selected sample of FOSS projects, and the accuracy of the
information about security fixes in them:
• Misleading commit messages. As pointed by Bird et al. [28] (and from our own
experience), linking CVE identifiers to specific commits in source code repositories is
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not trivial: developers may not mention fix commits in the NVD and security notes,
and they may not mention CVE identifiers within commit logs. Also, automatic
extraction of bug fix commits may introduce bias due to misclassification (e.g., a
developer mentions a CVE identifier in a commit that is not fixing this CVE). To
minimize such bias, we collected this data manually, using several data sources,
including third-party sources that do not belong to the actual projects. Manual data
collection allowed us to additionally verify that every vulnerability fix commit that
we collected is indeed a fix for a particular CVE, therefore we do not have the latter
bias of misclassification.
• Tangled code changes in vulnerability fixes. There is a potential bias in bug-fix
commits, such that along with fixing relevant parts of the functionality, developers
may introduce irrelevant changes (e.g., refactor some unrelated code). Kawrykow
and Robillard [85], and Herzig et al. [73] explored to what extent bug-fix commits
may include changes irrelevant to the original purpose of the fix: while they show
that there may be significant amount of irrelevant changes for general bugs, Nguyen
et al. [112] observed that for the majority of security fixes this was not the case – this
is also supported by our findings of very “local” changes (Figure 5.5). The subset of
vulnerabilities that we checked manually did not contain such refactorings.
• Incomplete or broken histories of source code repositories. The commit history of
FOSS projects may be incomplete (e.g., migrating to different types of version control
systems, archiving or refactoring), limiting the analysis capabilities. We checked the
repository histories of all seven projects in our sample finding them all to be complete,
except for Jenkins. In case of Jenkins, at one point in time the whole repository layout
was deleted, and then re-created again. Our current implementation does not handle
such cases, as it works under the assumption that repositories are complete and
well-structured. Still, such cases (and similar ones) can be handled automatically,
extending the current implementation with more heuristics.
• Existence of complex “architectural” vulnerabilities. We improved over the work by
Nguyen et al. [112] by using slicing over the source code albeit limiting the scope
of the slice to distinct Java methods. This may be not adequate for sophisticated,
“architectural”, vulnerabilities. Nguyen et al. [112] have reported only a handful of
vulnerabilities in the Firefox and Chrome browsers that required to look at many files
and therefore called for inter-procedural slicing analysis (we also found few of such
vulnerabilities in our study). Hence, a prima facie evidence is that such complex
and rare vulnerabilities can be considered as outliers from the perspective of our
methodology. In such complex cases, additional analysis would be anyhow needed.
• Human error. Our manual validation of the screening tests over the subset of vul-
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nerabilities might be biased due to human errors and wrong judgement. In order to
minimize such bias, manual checks were performed by three different experts, who
were cross-checking and discussing the results of each other.
The internal validity of the results depends on our interpretation of the collected data
with respect to the analysis that we performed. We carefully vetted the data to minimize
the risk of wrong interpretations. We did not create exploits to test the actual behavior of
various versions against selected vulnerabilities (as it is close to impossible), performing
manual code audits instead.
The external validity of our analysis lies in generalizing to other FOSS components.
It depends on the representativeness of our sample of FOSS applications from Table
5.2, and the corresponding CVEs. As the FOSS projects that we considered are widely
popular, have been developed for several years, and have a significant number of CVEs,
those threats are limited for FOSS using the same language (Java), and having the same
popularity. Generalization to other languages (such as C/C++) should be done with care,
looking at Table 5.4.
5.11 Conclusions
We presented an automated, effective, and scalable approach for historical vulnerability
screening in large FOSS components, consumed by proprietary applications. Our ap-
proach represents an enhancement of the original SZZ approach [148] and its successors
(e.g., Nguyen et al. [112]), and can be applied to identify changes inducing generic soft-
ware bugs. However, the fixes of such bugs should have similar properties as the security
vulnerabilities that we discuss in this chapter (see Table 5.4), and should be “local”.
Otherwise, different heuristics for extracting the evidence may be needed.
While our current prototype is limited to vulnerabilities in Java source code, the ap-
proach can be extended to other programming languages and configurations. In practice,
it depends on the availability of a program slicer for a particular programming language.
Currently, our experimental validation has focused on a selection of software compo-
nents motivated by the needs of the security team at large enterprise software vendor. It
can be adapted to support other scenarios: e.g., for development teams to assess whether
the vulnerable functionality is actually invoked by a consuming application (as in Plate
et al. [123]), or for security researchers to improve the quality of vulnerability database
entries (as in Nguyen et al. [112]).
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Chapter 6
Effort Models for Security
Maintenance of FOSS Components
This chapter is motivated by the need of our industrial partner to estimate the effort
for security maintenance of FOSS components within its software supply chain. We
aim to assist in resolving Problem 3 of secure FOSS consumption (see Chapter 1) by
understanding whether various characteristics of a FOSS component (e.g., the number of
contributors, the popularity, the size of the code base, etc.) may indicate the potential
sources of “troubles” when it comes to the security of an application that consumes the
component. We investigated the publicly available factors to identify which ones may
impact the security maintenance effort.
6.1 Introduction
For most software vendors, FOSS components are an integral part of their software supply
chain. Initially, we started to work with the Central Security Team of our industrial
partner in order to validate whether static analysis (which was already used successfully
in the industry [19, 29]) can be used for assessing the security of FOSS components. We
realized that, while being the original motivation, it may be not the most urgent question
to answer. A more important task may be to allow the development teams to plan the
future security maintenance effort due to FOSS components.
In case of our industrial partner, who ships the software that is used over very long
time periods (i.e., decades) by its customers, it is very common that this software contains
old versions of FOSS components, which are not necessarily supported by the open source
community. In this scenario, it becomes very important to be able to estimate the required
security maintenance effort, which may be either caused by down-porting a fix to the
actual consumed version, or by upgrading it.
During the course of the case study that we describe in Chapter 3, we identified that
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the developers of our industrial partner use a software inventory that contains high-level
information about FOSS components. After one of the internal presentations that we held
on the premises of our industrial partner at that time, we asked the following question to
the audience: “Think of different characteristics of FOSS projects for a moment. If you
are selecting one as a component for your own application, which of its characteristics
would you consider important from the security point of view?”. The majority of responses
were almost equally divided by the community factors (e.g., is the community alive?, does
the community have good a reputation? ), the popularity of a project (e.g., the number
of users and the age), as well as security-related characteristics (e.g., the history of past
vulnerabilities, and whether the developers of a project are using security code analysis
tools). The information about most of these characteristics can be found by looking into
this software inventory (which mostly contains publicly available information about FOSS
projects collected from different sources), and we were not surprised that the developers
were mentioning them.
As our goal is to identify which of the factors the developers can take into account,
when considering the security maintenance of projects that include FOSS components,
we had deliberately chosen to use the data that was present in that software inventory
(and similar data sources), as it is readily available to the developers, and this is what
they use when dealing with FOSS components. We formulate our research question as
follows:
RQ3 Which factors have a significant impact on the security effort to manage a FOSS
component in different maintenance models?
We concentrated our collaboration on performing a study over the 166 FOSS compo-
nents that we identified during our exploratory case study (see Section 3.2 in Chapter 3).
We extracted different publicly available characteristics of these components, and used
them as factors. We sketched different security maintenance models for assessing whether
these factors may impact the future security maintenance of the internal projects that
use these components.
The case study described in Chapter 3 also helped us to delineate the key features that
a model for capturing the economics of software maintenance should have for extending
it to security. We build on the seminal study of Banker et al. [20] on the variables that
impact the software maintenance as a whole. One of the first challenges we have to face, in
comparison to Banker et al. [20], is that we cannot measure the software vendor working
hours on security maintenance alone (as this data is not separable from the “functional”
maintenance), nor we can measure them on each consumed FOSS component (as this
data is simply not available). Hence, we need to identify suitable proxies.
In the present study we adopted several elements of the Grounded Theory approach
initially proposed by Glaser and Strauss [64]. The goal of this approach is to construct
a theory based on a phenomenon that can be explained with data [69]. The approach
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follows the principle of emergence [67]: the data gain their relevance within the analysis
through the systematic generation and interactive conceptualization of codes, concepts
and categories. Data that are similar in nature are grouped together under the same
conceptual heading (category). Categories are developed in terms of their properties and
dimensions, and finally they provide the structure of the theory [155].
To identify the right factors to consider when evaluating the impact of FOSS com-
ponents on the security maintenance effort, we incorporate several maintenance models:
(1) distributed, where each development team fixes its own set of components, and
the security maintenance effort scales linearly with the number of used components; (2)
centralized, where the vulnerabilities of a FOSS component are fixed centrally and
then pushed to all consuming products (and therefore the effort scales sub-linearly in the
number of products); and (3) hybrid, in which only the least used FOSS components are
selected and maintained by individual development teams.
We consider these distinctions between the models, as we try to take into account the
software familiarity aspect discussed in studies by Banker et al. and Chan et al. in [20,
21,35]: in centralized and hybrid security maintenance models, a proprietary software
vendor could have a centralized team of experts that consolidates the necessary knowledge
about the population of FOSS projects used internally. In these models, the “bulk”
security issue resolution may be beneficial when the number of usages of a component is
high. These models are further discussed in Section 6.3.
6.2 A Conceptual Model of Business And Technical Drivers
A key question is how to capture the security maintenance effort in broad terms. We
identified four main areas that impact the maintenance effort due to security. Figure 6.1
summarizes the relationships between them. The main areas are as follows:
1. Proxy for code complexity: this area of factors comprises of various quantitative char-
acteristics of FOSS projects that represent their overall complexity. This complexity
may have an impact on the number of disclosed vulnerabilities, thus affecting the
maintenance effort of resolving them.
2. FOSS community: this area includes both quantitative and qualitative factors that
reflect characteristics of community around a FOSS project, being a function of the
project’s general popularity and the appeal to contributors. This area also reflects
the chances that a project will be selected as a component by external developers.
Some of the factors from the previous category and the present one may belong to
both areas at the same time (e.g., the popularity of used technologies, such as the
programming language used for implementation), therefore we group them into the
sub-area that represents the ease of analysis for security researchers.
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The key drivers for the security maintenance effort are represented by suitable proxies (defined above), each of
them corresponds to an area of factors that may impact the global security maintenance.
Figure 6.1: The model for the impact of various factors on the security maintenance
3. Secure development and testing: the factors that characterize how well secure devel-
opment and testing activities are built into the lifecycle of a FOSS project. These fac-
tors may influence the potential security issues that the consumers of FOSS projects
may face.
4. Maintenance and contribution models: the factors that identify the response, main-
tenance and support processes within a FOSS project. This particular area rep-
resents the appeal of a FOSS project for potential consumers with respect to the
maintainability and support in general, as well as the availability of security-related
information about the project.
Although many of the factors from the above areas are not specific to security and are
used as general predictors for software bugs, we show in Section 2.3.2 (Chapter 2) that
there are works such as Ozment [120], Shin and Williams [146], Shin et al. [145], that
support their relevance to the security vulnerabilities.
In Section 6.4 we discuss the potential data sources from which various factors can be
collected. Below we describe each area of impact in detail.
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Table 6.1: Proxy for code complexity drivers
Factor Source Collection
method
Description References
Size Open Hub,
code repository
Automatic The total size of the code
base of a project (LoC).
[31], [63], [87], [24], [172], [20]
Changes Open Hub,
code repository
Automatic The development activ-
ity of a project (e.g.,
the added/deleted lines of
code)
[109] [63] [175] [145] [84] [171]
Commits Open Hub,
code repository
Automatic The total number of the
source code commits.
[109] [145] [171]
Age Open Hub,
code repository
Automatic The age of a project
(years).
[121] [171] [84]
6.2.1 Proxy For Code Complexity Drivers
The age of a project (#Age), its size (#Size), and the number of changes (#Changes)
are traditionally used in various studies that investigate defects and vulnerabilities in
software [63, 87], software evolution [24, 31] and maintenance [171]. For example, the
study by Koru et al. [87] demonstrated a positive relationship between the size of a code
base (LoC) of a project and its defect-proneness. Zhang [172] evaluated the LoC metric
for the software defect prediction and concluded that larger modules tend to have more
defects.
The number of security bugs can grow significantly over time [91], and many works
(see [63, 84, 109, 145, 171, 175]) suggest a positive relation between the number and the
frequency of changes in the source code (#Changes in time: e.g., commits, added/deleted
lines of code), and the number of software defects1.
Table 6.1 summarizes the factors that we identified for this area of impact.
6.2.2 FOSS Community Drivers
Several studies considered the popularity of FOSS projects as being relevant to their
quality and maintenance [128,138,171]. It is a folk knowledge that “Given enough eyeballs,
all bugs are shallow” [128], meaning that FOSS projects have the unique opportunity to be
tested and scrutinized not only by their developers, but by their user community as well.
In our case, we also assume that the overall popularity (the number of users, developers,
etc.) will impact the chances that a particular FOSS component will be selected, thus,
the user count (#Users) impacts the overall number of vendor’s products that consume
the component. The number of downloads (#Downloads) can serve as another alternative
1We consider security vulnerabilities to be particular software defects (see [168]), which may be impacted by these factors.
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Table 6.2: FOSS community drivers
Factor Source Collection
method
Description References
Popular
programming
language
Project website,
Open Hub,
code repository
Automatic The project is mostly writ-
ten in Java, C, C++, PHP,
JavaScript, SQL, etc.
[98] [118]
Developers Project website,
Open Hub,
code repository
Automatic The number of unique de-
velopers.
[145] [171] [25]
Users Project website,
Open Hub
Automatic The user count of a project
(Open Hub).
[128] [124] [1] [171] [138]
[167]
Downloads Project website,
CII Census
Semi-
automatic
The number of downloads
of project releases or pack-
ages.
[43]
measure for popularity [43]. Apart from the popularity measure, the number of developers
(#Developers) of a software product may serve as an independent factor that impacts the
number of bugs or vulnerabilities in that product (for instance, see [25]).
Understanding how software works is a necessary prerequisite for successful software
maintenance and development (see [21, 22, 59]). Ostrand et al. [118] observed that in
multi-language projects the files that are implemented in certain programming languages
may contain more bugs than the others. While the authors [118] did not suggest that
certain languages may be more prone to bugs, they stress the importance of considering
various programming languages in connection to the number of bugs.
Also, according to the vulnerability discovery process model described by Alhazmi et
al. [6], the longer is the active phase of a software the more attention it will attract, and
the more malicious users will get familiar with it to “break” it (as an additional side-effect
of using a popular programming language or a popular technology).
Table 6.2 summarizes the factors that we identified for this area of impact.
6.2.3 Secure Development, Testing, Maintenance And Contribution Drivers
Secure design specifications help the developers (especially the less experienced ones)
to build a more secure product [99]. The availability of such documentation for external
reviewers helps to eliminate the security defects at the early stage of product development.
Additionally, the practice of internal reviews (e.g., the source code commits are checked
before the code is pushed into production) improves the overall quality and the security
of the product [100]. Finally, the presence of the secure coding standards as a taxonomy
of common programming errors [82, 144] (which had led to security vulnerabilities in the
past) reduces the amount of future vulnerabilities and the efforts for security maintenance.
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Wheeler [166] suggested that successful FOSS projects should use static analysis se-
curity testing (SAST) tools, which should at least reduce the amount of trivial vulner-
abilities [39] (see [40] for the examples of such vulnerabilities). Penetration testing and
dynamic analysis security testing (DAST) tools facilitate the early discovery of security
vulnerabilities [11], while maintaining the security regression tests for past vulnerabilities,
and tests for the security-critical functionality ensure that the same (or similar) security
issues are not re-introduced, thus lowering the security maintenance effort.
Planned maintenance and support for FOSS projects can be a critical factor that in-
fluences the choice of a project as a component: this will enable consumers to plan ahead
when they should make a decision on whether to select a replacement project when the
maintenance becomes too costly, or fork a FOSS project and provide support internally.
The ease of contribution to the project (such as clear guidelines for new developers and
transparent contribution processes) may prevent the necessity of forking a project.
The same is true for development and distribution models of a FOSS project: if these
models do not match the models used by their consumers (or are not taken into ac-
count), this may bring disturbances to the software maintenance processes of consumers,
significantly increasing the corresponding efforts.
There are several security related-factors that may not impact the security maintenance
effort significantly, but have a direct effect on the reputation a project, making it more or
less appealing for selection. For instance, a project that provides means for downloading
its source and binary packages securely (via https, cryptographically signed or hashed)
protects its users from the malware that malicious third parties could inject into down-
loads. Additionally, the private vulnerability reporting process allows them to issue a fix
in a timely manner and notify their commercial partners before the vulnerability will be
publicly known.
Finally, the presence of a list of known past vulnerabilities maintained by the project
could as well simplify the task of identifying whether certain versions of that project are
vulnerable.
Table 6.3 summarizes the factors that we identified for this area of impact.
6.3 From Drivers to Effort Model for FOSS Maintenance
In Chapter 3 we have sketched some of the security activities that a development team
must perform during the maintenance phase. Unfortunately, a team is normally assigned
to several tasks, with security maintenance being only one of them. Therefore, it is
close to impossible to get analytical accounting for security maintenance to the level
of individual vulnerabilities. Furthermore, when a FOSS component is shared across
different consuming applications, each development team can differ significantly in the
choice of the solution and hence in the effort to implement it.
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Table 6.3: Secure development and testing, maintenance and contribution model drivers
Factor Source Collection
method
Description References
Security tests Project website,
code repository
Manual The test suite contains tests for
past vulnerabilities (regression)
and/or tests for security func-
tionality.
[166], [167], [1],
[40], [20]
Private vuln.
reporting
Project website Manual There is a possibility to report
security issues privately.
[105]
SAST/DAST tools Project website,
code repository,
Coverity website
Manual A project is using security code
analysis tools during develop-
ment.
[166], [167], [1], [39]
Secure design
specs
Project website,
documentation
Manual The secure design specification
of the project is documented.
[99]
Penetration
testing
Project website,
documentation
Manual The penetration testing is per-
formed regularly by the project
developers.
[11]
Coding
standards
Project website,
documentation,
code repository
Manual Secure coding standards are
documented.
[20], [82], [144]
List of known
vulnerabilities
Project website,
vulnerability
databases
Manual Past security vulnerabilities of
the project are documented and
are publicly available.
[167]
Devel. & distr.
model
Project website,
documentation
Manual The patch and release cycles are
documented.
[174]
Planned support
& maintenance
Project website,
documentation
Manual The maintenance roadmap and
support cycles for different ver-
sions of a project are docu-
mented.
[166]
Ease of
contribution
Project website,
documentation,
code repository
Manual Clear guidelines for new devel-
opers or potential contributors
are present.
Checked commits Project website,
documentation,
code repository
Manual There exists a review process for
new contributions, including se-
curity code reviews.
[100], [167]
Secure
downloads of
releases
Project website,
package
distribution stats.,
CII Census
Manual The project provides means for
downloading the source code
or binaries securely (e.g., https
protocol, cryptographic signa-
tures).
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Banker et al. [20] have already shown that maintenance models do not scale linearly,
and that software maintenance may be affected by economies of scale. Preliminary discus-
sions with developers and researchers of our industrial partner suggested the combination
of vulnerabilities of the FOSS component itself and the number of company’s products
using it can be a satisfactory proxy for the security maintenance effort. A large number
of vulnerabilities may be the sign of either a sloppy process or a significant attention by
hackers and may warrant a deeper analysis during the selection phase or a significant re-
sponse during the maintenance phase. This effort is amplified when several development
teams are asking to use a FOSS component, as a vulnerability which eschewed detec-
tion may impact several hundred products and may lead to several security patches for
different products.
We also considered the option of using the number of exploits from the Offensive Secu-
rity database (http://www.offensive-security.com) as an alternative metric. Num-
bers of vulnerabilities and exploits have a strong correlation in our sample of projects
(Spearman’s rho = 0.71, p < 0.01) – it could be because security researchers can create
exploits to test published vulnerabilities and, alternatively, they can create exploits to
test a vulnerability they have just found (for which a CVE entry does not yet exist). We
tested both values without finding significant differences and, for simplicity, we use the
number of vulnerabilities as the proxy for effort since this was considered by developers a
“standardized” information available from known trusted sources, whereas exploits would
come from less neutral sources.
We assume that the effort structure has the following form:
e = efixed +
m∑
i=1
ei (6.1)
where ei is a variable effort that depends on the i-th FOSS component, and efixed is a
fixed effort that depends on the security maintenance model (e.g., the initial set up costs).
For example, with a distributed security maintenance approach an organization will have
less communication overhead and more freedom for developers in distinct product teams,
but only if a small number of teams are using a component.
Let |vulns i| be the number of vulnerabilities that have been cumulatively fixed for the
i-th FOSS component and let |products i| be the number of proprietary products that use
the component:
1. In centralized model a security fix for all instances of a FOSS component is issued
once by the Central Security team of the company and then distributed between
all products that are using it. This may happen when, as a part of FOSS selection
process, development teams must choose only components that have been already
used by other teams and are supported by the company. To reflect this case, the
effort for security maintenance in this model scales logarithmically with the number
97
CHAPTER 6. EFFORT MODELS FOR SECURITY MAINTENANCE OF FOSS COMPONENTS
of products using a FOSS component.
ei ∝ log
(|vulns i| · |products i|) (6.2)
2. Distributed model covers the case when security fixes are not centralized within a
company, so each development team has to take care of security issues in FOSS com-
ponents that they use. In this scenario the effort for security maintenance increases
linearly with the number of products using a FOSS component.
ei ∝ |vulns i| · |products i| (6.3)
3. Hybrid model combines the two previous models: security issues in the least con-
sumed FOSS components (e.g., used only by lowest quartile of products consuming
FOSS) are not fixed centrally. After this threshold is reached and some effort lin-
early proportional to the threshold of products to be considered has been invested,
the company fixes them centrally, pushing the changes to the remaining products.
ei ∝
|vulns i| · |products i| if |products i| ≤ p0p0 · |vulns i|+ log(|vulns i| · (|products i| − p0)) otherwise (6.4)
As shown in Figure 6.2, hybrid model is a combination of distributed and centralized
models, when centralization has a steeper initial effort. The point V0 is the switching point
where the company is indifferent between centralized and distributed effort models.
Hybrid model captures the possibility of a company to switch models after (or before) the
indifference point. The fixed effort of centralized model is obviously higher than the
one of distributed model (e.g., setting up a centralized team for fixing vulnerabilities,
establishing and communicating a fixing process, etc.).
Hence, we extend the initial function after the threshold number of products p0 is
reached, so that only a logarithmic effort is paid on the remaining products. This has the
advantage of making the effort ei continuous in |products i|. An alternative would be to
make the effort logarithmic in the overall number of products after |products i| > p0. This
would create a sharp drop in the effort for the security maintenance of FOSS components
used by several products after p0 is reached. This phenomenon is neither justified on the
field, nor by the economic theory. In the sequel, we have used for p0 the lowest quartile
of the distribution of the selected products.
We are not aiming to select a particular model – we consider them as equally possible
scenarios. Our goal is to see which of the FOSS characteristics can have an impact on
the security maintenance effort when such models are in place, keeping in mind that this
impact could differ from one model to another.
We now define the impact that the characteristics of the i-th FOSS component have
on the expected effort ei as a (not necessarily linear) function fi of several variables and
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Number of products
Effort
hybrid
model
distributed
model
centralized
model
V0
initial
effort
(β0)
Centralized model has initial set up costs β0 (setting up and training the team, communications overhead, etc.),
and the effort scales logarithmically with the number of applications where components are used, and the number
of vulnerabilities in them. Distributed model does not suffer from β0, but the growth in effort is linear, which
generates additional costs when the number of usages of a component is large. Hybrid model is a combination of
distributed and centralized models, when centralization has a steeper initial cost. V0 is the switching point in
the number of usages where a company is indifferent between the previous two models.
Figure 6.2: Illustration of the three effort models
a stochastic error term i:
ei = f(xi1, . . . , xil, yil+1, . . . , yim, dim+1, . . . , dn) + i (6.5)
The variables xij, j ∈ [1, l] impact the effort as scaling factors, so that a percentage
change in them also implies a percentage change in the expected effort. The variables
yij, j ∈ [l + 1,m] directly impact the value of the effort. Finally, the dummy variables
dij, j ∈ [m + 1, n] denote qualitative properties of the code captured by a binary classifi-
cation in {0, 1}.
For example, in our sample of FOSS components, the 36-th component is “Apache
CXF”, and the first scaling factor for effort is the size of the code base of the component
(LoC), so that xi,1
.
= locsi, and x36,1 = 868, 183.
Given the above classification, we can further specify the impact equation for the i-th
component as follows
log(ei) = β0 + log
(
l∏
j=1
(xij + 1)
βj
)
+
m∑
j=l+1
βi · eyij +
n∑
j=m+1
βi · dij + i (6.6)
where β0 is the initial fixed effort for a specific security maintenance model.
All three models reflect to a certain extent on the experience of our industrial partner
in managing the security maintenance of FOSS components. These models focus on
technical aspects of security maintenance of consumed FOSS components, putting aside
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all organizational aspects2 such as the overhead of communications between different
development and maintenance teams, and interactions with customers. The models aim
to reflect (on the abstract level) how the cumulative maintenance effort will look like when
all FOSS components are fixed by a single team, many independent teams, or a mixture
of both.
Currently, we do not consider how exactly the knowledge about software security,
domain-specific knowledge about FOSS components, and other types of expertise may be
distributed within various teams in the three models (for example, centralized model
could have specialists that have in-depth knowledge in software security, but only high-
level knowledge about every FOSS component used company-wise, while in distributed
model the members of independent teams could have less knowledge in software security,
but much more knowledge of the FOSS components that they actually use). This may
affect, for example, how much effort does it take to perform fixes in certain locations of
FOSS components. These knowledge distributions may vary from company to company
and from team to team. It would be interesting to study how various differences in
expertise may affect the security maintenance effort with actual development teams in
several large software development companies – this could be a potential line for future
work.
6.4 Identification of Empirical Data
We considered the following public data sources to obtain the factors of FOSS projects
that could impact the security effort in maintaining them:
1. National Vulnerability Database (NVD) – the US government public vulner-
ability database. We use it as the main source of public vulnerabilities in FOSS
components (https://nvd.nist.gov/).
2. Open Sourced Vulnerability Database (OSVDB) – an independent public
vulnerability database. We use it as the secondary source of public vulnerabilities to
complement the data that we obtain from the NVD (http://osvdb.org).
3. Black Duck Code Center – a commercial platform for the open source governance
that can be used within an organization for the approval of the usage of FOSS
components by identifying legal, operational and security risks that can be caused
by these components. We use the installation of our industrial partner to identify
the most “interesting” FOSS components.
4. Open Hub (formerly Ohloh) – a free offering from Black Duck supported by
an online community that maintains statistics which represent various properties
of FOSS projects. Additionally, Open Hub retrieves data from the source code
repositories of FOSS projects (https://www.openhub.net/).
2For organizational aspects see [26].
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5. Coverity Scan Service website – in 2006 Coverity started the initiative of pro-
viding free static security testing code scans for FOSS projects, and many of the
projects have registered since that time. We use this website as one of the sources
that can help to infer whether a FOSS project is using SAST tools (https://scan.
coverity.com/projects)
6. Core Infrastructure Initiative (CII) Census – the experimental methodology
for parsing through the data of open source projects to help identify projects that
need some external funding in order to improve their security. We use a part of their
data3 to obtain information about Debian installations which is used within Census
as the measure of popularity of a project, and which we use as an additional measure
of popularity as well.
After searching for factors in a smaller sample of 50 projects we understood that only
variables that could be extracted automatically and semi-automatically are interesting
for the maintenance phase. Gathering the data manually introduces bias and limits
the size of a data set that we can analyze, and, therefore, the validity of the analysis
at all. Further, from the software vendor’s perspective, this data cannot be effectively
collected and monitored on a periodic basis. Thus, we removed the manual variables and
expanded the initial data set up to 166 projects (projects that are consumed by at least 5
products as indicated in the Black Duck repository of our industrial partne): we showed
the descriptive statistics of these projects earlier in Table 3.2 and Figure 3.1 (Chapter
3). Moreover, in spite of their intuitive appeal, we excluded dummy variables related to
the programming languages4 from the data analysis, because we realized that almost all
projects have components of both, so these variables would not be discriminating. We
also had to exclude other dummy variables (e.g., related to the presence of security tests,
or usages of SAST/DAST tools), as we realized that, given the amount of projects that
we considered, the most accurate way to extract this information is manual exploration.
However, even manual work would not be able to resolve the bias: when we could not
answer the question “are the developers of a project using SAST/DAST tools?” by looking
at various sources, it could only mean that we failed to find this information, and that
the answer to this question is unknown.
We also tried to find commonalities between FOSS projects in order to cluster them.
However, this process would introduce significant human bias. For example, the “Apache
Struts 2” FOSS component is used by the vendor as a library in one project, and as a de-
velopment framework in another one (indeed, it can be considered to be both a framework
and a set of libraries). If we “split” the “Apache Struts 2” data point into another two in-
stances marked as “library” and “framework”, this would introduce dependency relations
3https://www.coreinfrastructure.org/programs/census-project
4Such as variables that indicate whether there are parts of the code base written in programming languages without a
built-in memory management, or in scripting languages that could be prone to code injection vulnerabilities (see [167]).
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between these data points. Assigning arbitrarily only one category to such data points
would also be inappropriate. A comprehensive classification of FOSS projects would re-
quire to perform a large number of interviews with developers to understand the exact
nature of the usage of a component and the security risk. However, it is unclear what
would be the added value to developers of this classification and the time spent for the
interviews.
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The number of added and deleted lines of code could not be used as independent variables, since they have a
strong correlation with each other (as well as with the total number of lines of code, and other variables). On the
other hand, the fraction of changed lines of code by the total size (locsEvolution) can be used as an independent
predictor. The red triangles show the fraction of lines of code in scripting languages, the black circles show other
languages. The axes are logarithmic.
Figure 6.3: The rationale for using the locsEvolution metric
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Table 6.4: Cross correlations of the explanatory variables
(a) Spearman correlation coefficients
userCount debianInst contribs locs locsEvolution
years 0.47 0.47 0.09 0.33 0.04
userCount 0.45 0.34 0.35 0.19
debianInst -0.01 -0.01 -0.15
contribs 0.39 0.31
locs -0.12
(b) Variance inflation factors
Variable VIF
years 1.27
userCount 1.11
debianInst 1.18
contribs 1.12
locs 1.14
locsEvolution 1.02
As we are interested in performing a regression analysis to assess the impact of in-
dividual explanatory variables on the dependent variable – the maintenance effort, we
had to alter the number of variables in the analysis, as some of the initial variables that
we considered have strong correlations with each other: for instance, we had to remove
the number of commits as it strongly correlates with the size of the code base and the
number of developers. To assess the potential impact of the popularity of a programming
language, we tried to divide the size of the code base into two different variables: one of
them showing the size of the code base written in popular languages (e.g., Java, C/C++,
PHP, JavaScript), and the other showing the size of the code base implemented in other
less popular languages (e.g., Lisp, Scala). Eventually, we understood that it would in-
troduce the same multi-collinearity problem. Additionally, the numbers of deleted and
added lines of code has a strong correlation with the numbers of commits and developers,
and the size of the code base.
For the latter, we had to come up with another metric that would capture the changes
to the source code – locsEvolution. Figure 6.3 illustrates why we could not use the
added and deleted lines of code as factors, as they correlate with each other and with the
total lines of code locs. As locsEvolution does not have a strong correlation with locs,
it can be used as an independent variable.
Finally, we performed the correlation analysis of the remaining variables in order to
determine whether the multi-collinearity problem remains – Table 6.4. We first built the
correlation matrix using Spearman rank correlations: as can be seen from Table 6.4a,
there are weak-to-moderate correlations in some of the variables. However, according to
Stevens [152, pp74], the presence of such correlations does not necessarily affect the regres-
sion results. Therefore, we also calculated the variance inflation factors of each variable
(Table 6.4b), which is a widely used measure for assessing the degree of multi-collinearity
of independent variables. According to the rule of thumb proposed by Myers [108, pp369],
these values are acceptable and indicate that the selected explanatory variables do not
have significant cross influences.
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Table 6.5: Variables used for analysis
The table provides a short description of each selected explanatory variable, as well the rationale for including it
into the models. The last column shows the expected impact that a variable may have on the effort (positive or
negative).
Factor Description Rationale Exp.
β
locs (xij) Number of lines of code in various
programming languages (excluding
the source code comments).
The more there are lines of code, the more
there will be new vulnerabilities.
+
locsEvolution (yij) The fraction of the total number of
added and deleted lines of code by
the total number of lines of code.
We could not use the added/deleted lines
as factors, as they have a strong corre-
lation with each other, and with the to-
tal lines of code. As locsEvolution does
not have a strong correlation with the to-
tal lines, it can be used as an indepen-
dent variable that reflects the total level
of changes in a project.
+
userCount (yij) The number of active users (mea-
sured by Open Hub).
The more popular the project is, the more
it is likely that new vulnerabilities will be
discovered by the users.
+
debianInst (yij) The number of package downloads
from the Debian repository.
This variable provides an additional mea-
sure for popularity, however, these two
factors are not exactly correlated, as
some software is usually downloaded from
the Web (e.g., Wordpress), so it may
be unlikely that someone would install it
from the Debian repository, even if a cor-
responding package exists. On the other
hand, some software may be distributed
only as a Debian package.
+
years (yij) The age of a project (in years). More vulnerabilities can be discovered
over time.
+
contribs (yij) The number of unique contributors
for the whole history of the source
code repository of a project.
Too few contributors might induce vul-
nerabilities, as there may be not enough
workforce or expertise to catch security
defects before releases, so that other peo-
ple report them (resulting in CVE en-
tries).
−
Table 6.5 lists the set of finally selected explanatory variables, and shows their expected
impact on the security maintenance effort with respect to the model in Section 6.3. Table
6.6 shows the descriptive statistics of the response and explanatory variables.
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Table 6.6: Descriptive statistics of the variables used for the analysis
Statistic
Variable Min 1st Quartile Median Mean 3rd Quartile Max
log(effort centralized) 0.51 1.29 1.49 1.50 1.75 2.32
log(effort distributed) 0.69 3.64 4.44 4.81 5.76 10.13
log(effort hybrid) 0.69 3.24 3.78 4.12 4.94 8.42
years 1.00 7.00 10.00 10.27 13.80 28.00
userCount 0.00 9.00 52.00 258.00 178.00 9390.00
log(debianInst+1) 0.00 3.76 7.25 6.56 9.46 12.08
contribs 1.00 15.00 32.00 115.20 101.20 1433.00
log(locs) 7.88 10.70 12.02 11.89 13.09 16.96
locsEvolution 0.53 1.58 1.96 2.09 2.53 6.46
6.5 Analysis
To assess the potential impact of individual factors that characterize FOSS components
on the security maintenance effort, we employ the least-square regression (OLS). This
method assumes that the regression function is linear in the input, allowing for an easy
interpretation of the impact dependencies between explanatory and response variables,
as well as predictions of potential future values of the response. Most of other regression
methods can be perceived as modifications of the linear regression method that is relatively
simple and transparent as opposed to its successors [80, Chapter 3].
Our reported R2 values (0.21, 0.34, 0.42) and F-statistic values (7.17, 13.46, 19.28)
are acceptable, as our purpose is to see which variables have the impact. We have not
considered the variables in Table 6.3, as they cannot be automatically collected by the
vendor. Thus, we can only explain part of the variance.
The results of estimates for each security effort model are given in Table 6.7. These
results show that there is a positive relation between the size of the code base locs and
the effort variable (statistically significant only in distributed and hybrid models).
Zhang [172] and Koru et al. [87] show a positive relation between the size of a code base
and the number of defects (which is a component of the effort in our model).
The locsEvolution and contribs variables do not seem to have an impact. We
expected the opposite result, as many works (e.g., [63,109,145]) suggest a positive relation
between the number and the frequency of changes and defects. However, these works
assessed the changes with respect to distinct releases or components, while we are using
the cumulative number of changes for all versions in a project; we may not capture the
impact because of this.
Security bugs grow over time [91], which can be explained by the interest of attack-
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Table 6.7: Regression Results
locs has positive and statistically significant impact in distributed and hybrid models. years has positive and
statistically significant impact in all three models. userCount and debianInst have statistically significant, but
small impact in all three models.
Centralized model Distributed model Hybrid model
Intercept 8.90 · 10−1 (3.89)*** 1.83 (2.15)* 7.92 · 10−1 (1.21)
years 1.97 · 10−2 (2.64)** 8.14 · 10−2 (2.93)** 7.12 · 10−2 (3.34)**
userCount 7.86 · 10−5 (2.12)* 5.02 · 10−4 (3.63)*** 4.09 · 10−4 (3.86)***
debianInst 1.75 · 10−6 (2.54)* 9.31 · 10−6 (3.63)*** 8.51 · 10−6 (4.33)***
contribs −1.17 · 10−4 (−0.85) −5.33 · 10−4 (−1.04) −2.32 · 10−4 (−0.59)
log(locs) 3.02 · 10−2 (1.48) 1.56 · 10−1 (2.06)* 1.95 · 10−1 (3.35)**
locsEvolution 2.43 · 10−4 (0.43) 1.04 · 10−3 (0.49) 1.21 · 10−3 (0.75)
N 166 166 166
Multiple R2 0.21 0.34 0.42
Adjusted R2 0.18 0.31 0.40
F-statistic 7.17 (p < 0.01) 13.46 (p < 0.01) 19.28 (p < 0.01)
Note, t-statistics are in parentheses. Signif.codes: * 1%, ** 0.01%, *** 0.001%
ers [6], and the vulnerability discovery rate being highest during the active development
phase of a project [95]. Our results show that years - the age of a project, has a significant
impact in all three models, thus supporting these observations.
We found that in our models the number of external users (userCount and debian-
Inst) of a FOSS component has a small but statistically significant impact. This could
be explained by the intuition that only a major increase of the popularity of a FOSS
project could result in more development teams that select the project for consumption,
and that not every user would have enough knowledge in software security for finding and
reporting new vulnerabilities.
6.6 Threats to validity
The construct validity might be affected by errors in the data collection process, as well
as the accuracy of data in the data sources that we used. To combat the first threat we
carefully checked the collected data, removing duplicates and performing manual spot
checks. The latter threat should be minimal, as we used the same data sources that the
developers of our industrial partner are typically using.
The internal validity might suffer from wrong interpretation of the results and the choice
of the dependent variable. We could not measure the direct security maintenance effort
(e.g., working hours of developers) as it is not separable from the regular maintenance,
and it could not be separated by distinct FOSS components. Therefore, we had to choose
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a proxy variable for the security maintenance effort that consists of the number of publicly
known vulnerabilities in a FOSS component and the number of usages of these components
in the internal software applications. While this approximation may lead to a potential
threat to validity, we selected this dependent variable as being relevant to the security
maintenance effort based on our discussions with the developers and researchers of our
industrial partner (being also limited on the data that is available to the developers of
our industrial partner).
To minimize the threats due to potential lack of generalizability and potential over-
fitting of the results, we had to limit the number of independent variables that we con-
sidered for regression analysis. Therefore, our conclusions are based on the analysis of a
subset of factors that we initially identified. Moreover, as we were deliberately using only
the high-level information that is available to the developers of our industrial partner,
there could be a lack of causation between the factors that we assessed and our measure
of the effort. Still, our findings are supported by the existing literature on software defect
and vulnerability prediction, which lets us to assume that this threat is minimized.
The external validity might suffer from the lack of generalizability. The sample of FOSS
projects that we considered is relevant for our industrial partner, which may not be the
case for other software vendors. Still, the majority of FOSS components correspond to the
Java ecosystem, and Java is one of the most popular programming languages (according to
TIOBE index5). This suggests that the study is likely relevant for other software vendors
as well.
6.7 Conclusions
In this chapter, we have investigated publicly available factors that can impact the effort
required for performing security maintenance within large software vendors that have
extensive consumption of FOSS components. We have defined three security effort models
– centralized, distributed, and hybrid, and selected variables that may impact these
models. We automatically collected data on these variables from 166 FOSS components
currently consumed by the products of our industrial partner, and analyzed the statistical
significance of these variables.
As a proxy for security maintenance effort of consumed FOSS components we used
the combination of the number of products using these components, and the number of
known vulnerabilities in them. As the summary of our findings, the main factors that
influence the security maintenance effort whose are its age, size, and popularity. In fact,
the external popularity of a FOSS component has statistically significant but small impact
on the effort, meaning that only large changes in popularity will have a visible effect.
5http://www.tiobe.com/tiobe-index/
107
CHAPTER 6. EFFORT MODELS FOR SECURITY MAINTENANCE OF FOSS COMPONENTS
We had to limit the number of variables that we consider in our effort models to
avoid potential over-fitting and the lack of generalizability of the results. This is a direct
consequence of the fact that the ground truth data is difficult to obtain, and the amount
of data that is available is not uniform across all population of FOSS projects.
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Conclusions and Future Work
The aim of this dissertation is to aid large software vendors (in particular, our industrial
partner), that integrate many FOSS components into their software products, in facili-
tating security maintenance of these components: we provide a solution for testing and
adaptation of existing exploits against web applications to identify whether vulnerabili-
ties can be reproduced in specific environments in which these applications are deployed
(Chapter 4); we propose a vulnerability screening method for identification of versions
likely affected by a newly disclosed vulnerability (Chapter 5); finally, we assess the of
impact of various FOSS component characteristics on their security maintenance effort
(Chapter 6).
In Chapter 4 we discussed TestREx– a testbed for repeatable exploits. The work be-
hind TestREx is currently protected with a US patent [136], and, besides expanding our
corpus, we intend to apply TestREx for several research activities, such as large-scale
testing of static analysis tools and semi-automatic generation of test cases for web applica-
tions. We also used it successfully for teaching a Master course on security vulnerabilities
in web applications.
To move towards the generation of test cases, we plan to refine our implementation of
exploit scripts into a hierarchy of exploit classes that would help to write exploits faster.
This could be achieved by factoring common attributes of exploit types and altering the
exploit attributes in case if a given exploit did not work. Another possible future direction
for TestREx can be in helping testers to find various sets of software environments that
serve as the necessary pre-condition for a certain vulnerability exploit to successfully
execute.
In Chapter 5 we discussed the vulnerability screening method for estimating the like-
lihood of an older version of a FOSS component to be affected by a newly disclosed
vulnerability, using the vulnerability fix. The software prototype that implements the
method can be used as a standalone tool, or be integrated into other tools that already
exist and are used by the developers during the SDL phase or post-release maintenance
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activities. Currently, we are actively refining the research prototype for the possibility
of further integration with the existing toolchain of our industrial partner. To improve
the vulnerability screening we see several lines of future work that would allow to better
understand the “quality-versus-speed” trade-offs as well as to extend the scope of our
approach:
• Improve the quality of the vulnerability screening by associating changes across mul-
tiple files, as well as investigating the impact of more precise slicing algorithms.
However, we do not expect a significant improvement in the latter direction as, in
our experience, vulnerabilities were mostly fixed locally by modifying few lines.
• Improve the quality of estimation of the update effort by including changes in build
dependencies (direct and transitive), which might influence the estimate. For exam-
ple, consider an application that only runs on Java 1.4 and a FOSS upgrade that
would require Java 1.8: to resolve this dependency conflict, either the fixes for the
FOSS components need to be back-ported to Java 1.4, or the entire application needs
to be ported to Java 1.8.
• Extend the approach to more programming languages and test the approach on
different types of projects.
In Chapter 6 we have investigated the publicly available factors that can impact
the effort required for performing security maintenance of FOSS components in soft-
ware products of our industrial partner. We have defined three security effort models –
centralized, distributed, and hybrid, and selected variables that may impact these
models. We automatically collected data on these variables from 166 FOSS components
currently consumed by various products of our industrial partner, and analyzed these
models. As a proxy for security maintenance effort of consumed FOSS components we
used the combination of the number of products using these components, and the num-
ber of known vulnerabilities in them. As the summary of our findings, the main factors
that influence the security maintenance effort are the amount of lines of code of a FOSS
component, the age of the component, and its popularity. We have also observed that the
external popularity of a FOSS component has statistically significant but small impact
on the effort, meaning that only large changes in popularity will have a visible effect.
For further development of security maintenance effort models, we plan to collect a
wider dataset on FOSS projects and their factors (as well as their vulnerabilities), and
assess the potential effect of these other factors. Using this data for the effort prediction
is also a promising direction for the future work.
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